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TAKING THE BLUE PILL: THE




No corporate governance issue captures the imagination and frustration
of the American public and politicians more than executive compensation.
Despite decades of varied responses to address soaring executive compen-
sation such as tax measures, board independence requirements, and man-
dated disclosures, executive compensation levels continue to soar, as does
the saliency of executive compensation as a political issue. Most of the
legal literature on executive compensation has focused on the conduct of
wayward managers. This Article, however, examines the impact of politi-
cal behavior (that is, lawmaker opportunism) on executive compensation
reform. For lawmakers, executive compensation reform operates as a blue
pill-a mechanism for lawmaker diversion and responsibility-shifting that
diverts corporate constituent and scholarly attention away from more im-
portant corporate governance and socio-economic issues. This scenario
threatens the prospect of optimal reform. Executive compensation reform
is analogous to a service exhibiting credence characteristics. Credence
characteristics are service attributes whose quality cannot be fully deter-
mined even after significant use. Examples of services with substantial
credence characteristics include automobile repair services, medical treat-
ments, and corporate law. In the corporate law context, corporate
lawmakers-for example, the state of Delaware and the federal govern-
ment-not only provide reform services, but also act as experts and diag-
nose corporate governance problems. Information asymmetries between
lawmakers and various corporate constituencies (for example, managers,
shareholders, and populist groups) create perverse incentives for opportu-
nistic lawmaker behavior. The unobservable impact of executive compen-
sation reform provides lawmakers with added discretion that is often used
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for incremental, moderate, or conservative corporate reforms, even in the
face of crisis. On the other hand, sweeping reforms are unlikely because
they pose a serious risk to political capital. Therefore, lawmaker cries for
executive compensation reform should be approached with vigilance.
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I. INTRODUCTION
"[T]he [Matrix is the] world that has been pulled over your eyes to blind
you from the truth. 1
"Government is the solution to some problems and the source of
others. "2N O corporate governance issue captures the imagination and frus-
tration of the American public and politicians more than execu-
tive compensation.3 Next to the decision to sell or merge a
company, the selection of a CEO is perhaps the most important decision
1. THE MATRIX (Warner Bros. & Vill. Roadshow Pictures 1999). Due to the popu-
larity of the 1999 film "The Matrix," the terms "blue pill" and "red pill" have become a
popular metaphor for the choice between blissful ignorance or the examined life, respec-
tively. See id. In the film, the protagonist Neo is given the choice between (i) a blue pill
preserving the status quo of blissful ignorance or (ii) a red pill revealing the deeper truth of
the Matrix. Id. Neo chooses the latter and his adventure ensues. See id. In essence, the
Matrix is nothing more than a computer generated program to control the minds of human
beings, who are unwittingly being harvested as an energy source for world-dominating ma-
chines. See id. In the words of the character Morpheus: "[The Matrix] is the world that has
been pulled over your eyes to blind you from the truth." Id. Similarly, this Article con-
tends that executive compensation reforms over the past two decades are diversionary blue
pills.
2. Gordon Tullock, Public Choice, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF Ec-
ONOMICS 1040, 1044 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987).
3. See Joshua Chaffin, Executives May Have to Return Bonuses, FIN. TIMES
(London), Apr. 10, 2003, at 7 ("Senator Chuck Grassley, chairman of the Senate finance
committee, yesterday introduced the Corporate Accountability in Bankruptcy Act, which
would allow trustees to recover bonuses, deferred compensation and loans extended to
executives and officers the year prior to the company's bankruptcy filing."); Caroline
Daniel, Delta Chief to Have Pay Cut, FIN. TIMES (London), Apr. 5, 2003, at 10 ("Leo Mul-
lin, chief executive of Delta, is to cut his future pay package by about Dollars 9m, and take
a 25 per cent salary cut effective immediately as political pressure grows on pay levels for
airline executives."); Caroline Daniel & Jeremy Grant, Success Must Dictate Bosses' Pay,
Says Bush, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 1, 2007, at 5 ("Governments should not decide the
compensation for America's corporate executives but the salaries and bonuses of chief
executives should be based on their success and improving their companies and bringing
value to their shareholders." (quoting President George W. Bush)); Jeremy Grant, Obama
Joins Push on Executive Pay Awards, FIN. TIMES (London), Apr. 21, 2007, at 4 (citing
Senator Barack Obama's introduction of a say-on-pay bill in the Senate identical to the
one Congressman Barney Frank introduced in the House of Representatives); David
Leonhardt, Anger at Executives' Profits Fuels Support for Stock Curb, N.Y. TIMES, July 9,
2002, at Al ("In a step that would have been unthinkable in the long economic boom of
the 1990's, an expanding array of big investors, policy makers and even a few business
leaders are arguing that top executives should be required to keep much of their own
company stock for as long as they hold their jobs."); Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Options Foe Is
Not So Lonely Now, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2002, at B2 (describing how Congressman Carl
Levin, D-Michigan, "proposed legislation that would strip companies of the lucrative tax
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a board will make. In some instances, hiring a highly touted CEO can
boost a company's market valuation by fifteen percent or more.4 Despite
the importance of the decision to hire a CEO, the amount of attention
executive compensation receives exceeds its impact on corporate per-
formance. This overemphasis is due, in large part, to lawmaker opportu-
nism upon which this Article focuses.
Whereas most of the corporate law literature on executive compensa-
tion has focused on rent extraction by wayward corporate managers, 5 this
Article uses a moderate form of public choice theory to examine the im-
pact of lawmaker opportunism on the shape of executive compensation
reform. Public choice theory generally assumes that political actors, like
private market actors, are mainly self-interested and that the pursuit of
lawmaker self-interest may result in government failure, that is, ineffi-
cient policies.6 Thus, corporate lawmaker self-interest and opportunism,
just like wayward corporate managers, can be a source of rent extraction,
inefficiency, and welfare loss. 7 The existing legal literature, however, fails
to capture the complexity of the executive compensation issue from a
political perspective. This Article fills a critical gap in the legal literature
by arguing lawmaker motivations, in large part, explain the inconsisten-
cies, inefficiencies, perceived bias, and symbolism characterizing execu-
tive compensation reform for almost two decades.
The executive compensation debate achieved national prominence in
the early 1990s in response to perceived excesses of the 1980s.8 In 1992,
benefits they receive when options are exercised, unless they deduct the cost of options on
their income statements").
4. See, e.g., Max Landsberg, In Search of Excellence in CEO Succession: The Seven
Habits of Highly Effective Boards 1 (Mar. 15, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.
heidrick.com/IC/Published/Governance/ (follow "In search of excellence in CEO Succes-
sion: seven habits of highly effective boards" hyperlink); Tough at the Top, ECONOMIST,
Oct. 25, 2003, at 3; see also Rakesh Khurana & Nitin Nohria, The Performance Conse-
quences of CEO Turnover 39 TBL. 2 (2000), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stractid=219129.
5. See discussion infra Part II.C.
6. See Tullock, supra note 2, at 1041. A moderate form of public choice theory is a
useful paradigm not only to analyze the shape of the U.S. corporate law regime, but also to
predict when the interests of certain corporate constituencies (for example, managers,
shareholders, and populist groups) are likely to prevail in regulatory outcomes. See id. A
moderate form of public choice theory acknowledges other aspects of lawmaker utility
beyond the maximization of political capital, such as public interest considerations. See id.
7. See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for
Political Influence, 98 Q. J. ECON. 371, 371 (1983); Timothy J. Feddersen & Thomas W.
Gilligan, Saints and Markets: Activists and the Supply of Credence Goods, 10 J. ECON. &
MGMT. STRATEGY 149, 153 (2001); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Reg-
ulation, 19 J.L. & EcoN. 211 (1976).
8. See Kevin J. Murphy, Politics, Economics, and Executive Compensation, 63 U. CIN.
L. REV. 713, 713-14 (1994) [hereinafter Murphy, Politics]; see also Michael C. Jensen &
Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON. 225,
255-58 (1990) [hereinafter Jensen & Murphy, Performance Pay] (arguing community senti-
ment had constrained executive pay since the 1930s, decreasing CEO incentives). In 1991,
Martin Sabo, a Democratic Congressman from Minnesota, introduced a bill that would
prohibit corporate tax deductions for any executive pay exceeding twenty-five times the
pay of the lowest company employee. Murphy, Politics, supra, at 727. The same year,
Senator Carl Levin of Michigan introduced the "Corporate Pay Responsibility Act," which
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presidential hopeful Bill Clinton promised to end the practice of allowing
companies to take tax deductions for excessive executive pay.9 Deliver-
ing on his campaign pledge, President Clinton helped revamp Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) regulations to define executive compensation in
excess of one million dollars as excessive and not deductible as a corpo-
rate expense. 10 In hindsight, calling this reform effort unsuccessful is an
understatement." In the wake of the Clinton Administration's tax re-
form, executive pay rose to all-time highs, tripling in just eight years. 12
Unfortunately, this failed attempt at reform is not an isolated occurrence.
Despite decades of varied responses to address soaring executive com-
pensation such as tax measures, board independence requirements, and
mandated disclosures, executive compensation levels continue to soar, as
does the saliency of executive compensation as a political issue.' 3 Not
surprisingly, corporate scandals and the excesses of the early twenty-first
century continue to draw shareholder and public attention to executive
compensation and away from other important corporate governance and
socio-economic issues. In some of these scandals, managers distorted
earnings or engaged in other fraudulent conduct to enrich senior execu-
tives while shareholder value plummeted.' 4 Under such circumstances,
the impropriety is obvious. In other cases, hefty levels of executive com-
pensation, even in the absence of fraud or accounting irregularities, are
either (i) criticized for their tenuous link to performance or (ii) become a
rallying cry of populist concern, especially when they coincide with poor
was later preempted by changes to SEC proxy rules and disclosure requirements. Id. at
728-29.
9. David Leonhardt, Why Is This Man Smiling?: Executive Pay Drops Off the Political
Radar, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2000, at WK5 (asserting that President Bill Clinton vowed to
curb chief executive salaries and passed a tax law during his first year in office; subse-
quently, the average chief executive's salary tripled in the eight years following the tax
reform, yet executive pay "managed to disappear as a political issue").
10. Ryan Miske, Can't Cap Corporate Greed: Unintended Consequences of Trying to
Control Executive Compensation Through the Tax Code, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1673, 1675
(2004).
11. See id. at 1687 (asserting that the use of tax caps led to the unintended conse-
quences of increased levels of pay because the caps functioned as minimum base salaries
rather than the maximum).
12. See Leonhardt, supra note 9.
13. See id.; see also Nathan Knutt, Executive Compensation Regulation: Corporate
America, Heal Thyself, 47 ARIz. L. REV. 493, 494-95 (2005).
14. See Joann S. Lublin, CEO Compensation Survey (A Special Report): Milestones or
Missteps? A Rundown of Some of the Most Dubious Deeds in Executive Pay that Occurred
or Surfaced During 2005, WALL ST. J., Apr. 10, 2006, at R4 (citing questionable executive
compensation scenarios); Gretchen Morgenson, Executive Pay at Delphi Is Challenged,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2005, at C4 ("The lead plaintiffs in a class-action lawsuit against the
Delphi Corporation yesterday asked the judge overseeing the company's bankruptcy to
reject a proposed $110 million executive pay plan."); John Schwartz & Richard A. Oppel,
Jr., Enron's Collapse: The Chief Executive, N.Y. TiMES, Nov. 29, 2001, at C1 ("Over the
last decade or so, Mr. Lay earned some $300 million from Enron, mostly by exercising
stock options. Earlier this month, when employees grew incensed at the prospect of his
collecting a big severance package with the company's sale to Dynegy, he volunteered to
walk away from $60 million in payments.").
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corporate performance and unfavorable economic conditions. 15 Despite
the varied perspectives on the executive compensation issue, the execu-
tive compensation debate, from a political standpoint, is inextricably tied
to both shareholder wealth maximization and public accountability con-
cerns that often diverge. 16
In the midst of a severe economic recession and the contentious 2008
presidential election, presidential candidates indiscriminately invoked ex-
cessive executive compensation as a key corporate governance issue that
reflected social inequities and demanded a regulatory response. 17 The
advent of the Obama Administration reflects an even greater preoccupa-
tion with executive compensation reform.' 8 Irrespective of political rhet-
oric and posturing, the reduction of executive pay for a few individuals at
the top of the wealth pyramid may ameliorate populist outrage, but does
not necessarily put money back into the hands of ordinary Americans.' 9
15. See Murphy, Politics, supra note 8, at 725 (asserting that the executive compensa-
tion debate is a hybrid of populist backlash against high pay levels and shareholder effi-
ciency concerns); see also Book of Revelations, ECONOMIST, Jan. 21, 2006, at 61 (describing
how Michael Eisner, the former CEO of Walt Disney Corporation, "was a genuinely out-
standing manager during the first part of his more than 20 years at the top of the firm. But
he was then paid $800m over a 13-year period in which his company's shares did worse
than government bonds"); Eric Dash, For Ousted Citigroup Chief, a Bonus of $12.5 Mil-
lion, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2007, at C5 (describing how Citigroup CEO Chuck Prince "can
rest assured that he will leave with $68 million, including his salary and accumulated stock-
holdings; a $1.7 million pension; an office, car and driver for up to five years-all in addi-
tion to the bonus," despite the evaporation of his company's market valuation); Brett H.
McDonnell, Two Goals for Executive Compensation Reform, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 586,
586 (2008) (acknowledging two dimensions to the executive pay problem-a corporate
governance perspective and a social inequality perspective); Tom McGinty, Say-on-Pay
Doesn't Play on Wall Street, WALL ST. J., May 22, 2008, at C1 ("From 2004 to 2007, top
executives at Bear Stearns Cos., Citigroup, Goldman, J.P. Morgan, Lehman Brothers
Holdings Inc., Merrill and Morgan Stanley got about $3.63 billion in salary, bonuses, stock
grants and exercised options, according to figures disclosed for executives named in their
proxy filings and compiled by Standard & Poor's.").
16. See, e.g., McDonnell, supra note 15, at 588; Murphy, Politics, supra note 8, at 715;
Let the Fight Begin, ECONOMIST, June 14, 2008, at 18 ("Executive pay is not only a measure
of what society judges as fair; it is also a test of whether business is run for its
shareholders.").
17. See John Edwards, Editorial, My Plan to Stop Corporate Abuses, WALL ST. J., Jan.
2, 2008, at All ("As president, I will immediately cap untaxed deferred compensation for
executives."); David D. Kirkpatrick, Shake, Rattle, and Roil the Grand 01' Coalition, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 30, 2007, § 4, at 1 (describing how former Republican presidential candidate
Mike Huckabee criticized executive compensation); David Leonhardt, For Clinton, Gov-
ernment as Economic Prod, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2008, at Al (mentioning how Senator
Hillary Clinton, former Democratic presidential candidate, described some executive pay
as "offensive" and "wrong" and said that she wants to consider proposals for new laws
made by business school and law school professors); Joann S. Lublin, U.S. News: Candi-
dates Target Executive Pay, WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 2008, at A4 (describing how "Sen. Mc-
Cain recently blasted what he called the 'outrageous' and 'unconscionable' rewards
received by leaders of Bear Sterns Cos. and Countrywide Financial Corp. despite the credit
crisis;" meanwhile, "[ain Obama commercial that has aired in 14 states assails chief execu-
tives 'who are making more in 10 minutes than ordinary workers are making in a year'").
18. Edmund L. Andrews & Vikas Bajaj, U.S. Plans $500,000 Cap on Executive Pay in
Bailouts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com2009/02/04/busi-
ness/04pay.html?_r=l&hp.
19. See McDonnell, supra note 15, at 592-95. The impact of executive pay on income
inequality is fairly modest. Id. at 595-96. Empirical studies show executives' contribution
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Similarly, occasional disgorgements and reductions of pay for un-
derperforming CEOs and other senior executives provide only negligible
benefits to certain corporate constituencies. 20
In the broader political context, the overemphasis on executive com-
pensation is a diversion from other pertinent socio-economic issues like
the minimum wage, health insurance, social security, pension protection,
and the sub-prime mortgage crisis that are more relevant to ordinary
Americans and often addressed outside of the realm of traditional corpo-
rate law.21 Lawmakers often link executive compensation, albeit tenu-
ously, to broader economic turmoil, such as plant closings,
unemployment, outsourcing domestic jobs, and income inequality.22 For
lawmakers, the matrix of executive compensation reforms operates like a
blue pill, keeping corporate constituencies, especially populist groups, in
a state of blissful ignorance, foregoing a deeper analysis that reveals the
reality of lawmaker opportunism and manipulation.23 This Article con-
tends that corporate constituents and legal commentators, by ignoring the
political construction of the executive compensation issue, are in essence
taking a blue pill that threatens the prospect of optimal reform.
As executive compensation levels continue to rise despite decades of
lawmaker reforms (or multiple blue pills), the impact of such reforms is in
question. 24 For some corporate constituents, qualitative assessments of
corporate reform prove difficult because corporate reform exhibits
credence characteristics. Credence characteristics are service attributes
whose quality cannot be fully determined even after significant use.25
to income inequality is negligible because they comprise no more than five or six percent
of individuals in the top income bracket. See id. at 592-93.
20. See, e.g., Stuart Elliott, Interpublic Executives to Give Up Stock Options, N.Y.
TIMES, May 21, 2003, at C1 ("Eight executives at the meeting, including the present chair-
man and chief executive and his two immediate predecessors, said they would relinquish
more than 1.2 million stock options, with an unspecified amount earmarked to reward
employees at lower levels at the agencies owned by Interpublic."); Gretchen Morgenson,
Cendant's Chief Is Taking a Pay Cut, But Some Say That It's Hard to Determine How Much
of One, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2004, at C8 ("Bowing to shareholder pressure, Henry R.
Silverman, the chairman and chief executive of the Cendant Corporation and recipient of
one of the richest executive compensation packages in the United States, took a bit of a
pay cut yesterday as the company announced changes to his employment contract.").
21. See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 1.4 (1986) (distinguishing be-
tween traditional corporate law and other laws affecting corporations). Examples of other
laws affecting corporations include other types of regulation (for example, environmental,
labor, health, and safety regulations). Id.
22. See, e.g., Edmund L. Andrews, Democrats Link Fortunes to Rise in Minimum
Wage, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2006, at A18 (describing the Democratic party's campaign link-
ing executive pay to income inequality).
23. See THE MATRIX, supra note 1.
24. Knutt, supra note 13, at 506 (arguing that government regulation of executive com-
pensation is usually ineffective and that companies should self-regulate to quell outrage, in
order to prevent further government interference).
25. See Michael R. Darby & Edi Karni, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of
Fraud, 16 J.L. & ECON. 67, 68-69 (1973); Wolfgang Pesendorfer & Asher Wolinsky, Second
Opinions and Price Competition: Inefficiency in the Market for Expert Advice, 70 REV.
EcoN. STUD. 417 (2003); Asher Wolinksy, Competition in a Market for Informed Experts'
Services, 24 RAND J. EcoN. 380 (1993).
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Consumers of services with substantial credence characteristics (for ex-
ample, automobile repair services, medical treatments, and corporate
law) are never sure about the optimum amount (and even type) of the
service needed.26
Consider the following scenario: In the act of treating an ailing patient
a doctor recommends an invasive surgical procedure, a regimen of pre-
scription medication (that is, five blue pills daily), plus exercise and rest.
Assuming the patient's ailment improves, will the patient ever know
whether the surgical procedure was necessary or superfluous? Would the
blue pills and exercise regimen effectively cure the ailment? Or would
the body's natural healing response over time, without the intervention of
a doctor and medication, suffice? The patient in this scenario has limited
information and relies on the doctor's expertise for both the diagnosis
and treatment. Even after the medical services have been provided, the
patient still may have limited ability to evaluate the quality of the services
rendered. Given the bounded rationality of the patient, the doctor, with
informational advantages, has perverse incentives to provide excessive
treatment or withhold treatment where profitable. 27 Faced with this di-
lemma, the patient must resort to a number of crude heuristics to deter-
mine the quality of the medical services. The typical patient may: (i)
study degrees on a doctor's office wall; (ii) seek a second opinion, if avail-
able, from another physician; or (iii) seek the opinion of respected ac-
quaintances, friends, and family prior to selecting a physician. The
provision of corporate reform is, at times, analogous to the above
scenario.
In the corporate law context, corporate lawmakers-for example, the
state of Delaware and the federal government-not only provide reform
26. See id. at 69. Corporate regulation is more likely a service than a tangible good.
See generally U.C.C. § 2-105 (2005) (providing a definition of goods under the UCC). But,
regardless of whether one considers corporate regulation a service or good, the following
analysis will not change.
27. See Feddersen & Gilligan, supra note 7, at 158 ("When consumers cannot observe
the quality of a firm's product, there are strong incentives for opportunistic behavior, and
the resulting equilibrium does not maximize social welfare. This result is well known and
identifies the canonical failure of credence-good markets to attain economic efficiency.");
Frank A. Sloan & Mark A. Hall, Market Failures and the Evolution of State Regulation of
Managed Care, 65 J.L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 169, 172-75 (2002) (describing the credence
characteristics of medical services); see also Sawbones, Cowboys and Cheats, ECONOMIST,
Apr. 15, 2006, at 78 (discussing 1990s studies of Swiss surgeons, who had the ability, as well
as the incentives, to "overtreat" their patients due to information asymmetries, finding
surgeons less likely to operate on the most sophisticated patients, for example, lawyers'
spouses).
A similar example involves the provision of legal services. A lawyer communicates to
her corporate client that, in order to comply with certain regulations, the client must do X,
Y, and Z. Will action X suffice and eliminate the threat of noncompliance? Because legal
services involve questions of judgment against a backdrop of uncertainty, the client must
depend on the lawyer's judgment to not only provide services, but determine the adequate
level of service. In the above scenario, actions X, Y, and Z are inevitably more costly than
action X. See John C. Coates IV, Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses: Blame the
Lawyers, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1301, 1311-14 (2001) (characterizing takeover-related legal ad-
vice as a credence service).
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services but also act as experts and diagnose corporate governance
problems.28 The coupling of diagnosis and treatment, as well as informa-
tion asymmetries between lawmakers and various corporate constituen-
cies (for example, managers, shareholders, and populist groups), create
incentives for opportunistic lawmaker behavior.29 Accordingly, the
credence characteristics of corporate reform have significant implications
for corporate governance from both a supply and demand perspective.
Instead of seeking pecuniary profit, lawmakers seek to maximize political
capital. Unfortunately, due to information asymmetries, corporate con-
stituencies have difficulty detecting lawmaker opportunism and, in some
instances, lawmaker incompetence. Given the credence characteristics of
executive compensation reform, there is an enhanced risk that lawmakers
may mitigate political backlash and promote acquiescence without actu-
ally addressing fundamental flaws in the corporate governance system or
foregoing more effective redistributive policies and interventions.
Although the actual seller-consumer scenario differs from the political
context, 30 the supply and demand paradigm is nonetheless instructive for
analyzing the incentives of lawmakers and how corporate constituents
evaluate the efficacy of corporate reform services. Arguments asserting
that regulation is efficient, inefficient, necessary, unnecessary, fair, or un-
fair must also "show what is 'in it' for the political actors when they
move" in a particular direction.31 The analysis of credence characteristics
is a valuable complement to public choice approaches to corporate law
scholarship because it explains how the unobservable impact of corporate
reform facilitates even greater lawmaker discretion. Furthermore, it pro-
vides a realistic description of the interaction between lawmakers and va-
rious corporate constituencies by acknowledging the impact of political
behavior and information asymmetries on the shape of U.S. corporate
governance. Executive compensation is only part of a larger conversation
that might sensitize researchers to the impact of credence characteristics
on corporate reform.
Part II of this Article briefly describes the dynamics of executive pay
decisions and the limitations of existing theories addressing executive
pay. This Part argues that the primary deficiency among existing theories
addressing executive pay (that is, the market forces theory, the optimal
contracting theory, and the managerial power theory) is their insufficient
28. Whereas corporate scholars have discussed the credence characteristics of corpo-
rate legal services, none have discussed corporate reform as a service exhibiting credence
characteristics. See, e.g., Coates, supra note 27.
29. See Winand Emons, Credence Goods and Fraudulent Experts, 28 RAND J. ECON.
107, 111 (1997) (asserting that even ex-post, consumers have difficulty determining the
level of service needed ex ante).
30. In the buyer-seller scenario, the buyer in theory may choose other goods and ser-
vices if in a position to do so. Also, the exchange of political capital is not as fluid as the
exchange of monetary currency.
31. See Sam Peltzman, George Stigler's Contribution to the Economic Analysis of Reg-
ulation, 101 J. POL. ECON. 818, 824 (1993).
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treatment of politics and lawmaker opportunism (as opposed to manage-
rial incentives).
Part III illustrates the importance of credence characteristics in the cor-
porate reform context. This Part explains how Delaware and the federal
government, both arguably monopolist corporate lawmakers, supply cor-
porate reform services to corporate constituencies (for example, manag-
ers, shareholders, and populist groups). However, corporate lawmakers
not only provide reform services, they also act as experts diagnosing cor-
porate governance problems for corporate constituencies. Credence
characteristics and information asymmetries between lawmakers and cor-
porate constituents create perverse incentives for lawmaker opportunism.
Part IV analyzes credence characteristic-laden services from a supply-
side or lawmaker perspective. First, this Part argues that from a supply-
side perspective, credence characteristics raise questions concerning how
lawmakers may exploit information asymmetries to maximize political
capital. Credence characteristics allow lawmakers to straddle the fence
between political symbolism and conscientious resolution of corporate
governance issues. Second, this Part explores how lawmaker diagnosis of
the executive pay problem is often muddled and vacillates between the (i)
shareholder wealth-maximization perspective; and (ii) the public account-
ability perspective. From a political standpoint, executive pay is inextri-
cably tied to both of these perspectives that often diverge. Finally, this
Part examines the shape of lawmaker reform services such as judicial ar-
bitration services, procedural mandates to achieve independence, disclo-
sure-related reforms, shareholder voting reforms, tax-related measures,
and clawback measures. The total impact of these reforms, although ben-
eficial, is difficult to discern and politically determined.
Part V explores executive pay reforms from a demand or corporate
constituent perspective. From the demand perspective, credence charac-
teristics raise questions concerning how corporate constituents discern
the quality of corporate reform and lawmaker motivations. Corporate
constituents have different perspectives concerning what constitutes qual-
ity reform and may experience varying degrees of information asymmetry
that impact their ability to evaluate reform. Analogous to consumers in
product and service markets, corporate constituencies, out of necessity,
must rely on various heuristics as a proxy for quality when evaluating the
efficacy of corporate reform. Examples of these mechanisms include: (i)
third parties such as executive search firms, compensation consultants,
institutional shareholders, corporate watchdogs, and academics; (ii) pro-
cedures signaling fairness; and (iii) the lawmakers' credible commitment
and brand.
Part VI sets forth the key implications of the credence characteristic
analysis on executive compensation reform. In lieu of a specific policy
proposal, this Part examines the impediments to optimal reform. First,
this Part contends that the analysis of credence characteristics provides a
novel assessment of political effects on executive compensation reform. It
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reveals how lawmakers and corporate constituents respond to the unob-
servable impact of executive compensation reform. Moreover, credence
characteristics in the executive compensation reform context are only
part of a larger conversation that might sensitize researchers to the im-
pact of credence characteristics and political effects on corporate reform.
Second, this Part posits that the credence characteristics of executive
compensation reform provide greater discretion for lawmaker action,
particularly in response to less informed constituencies (for example,
populist groups). Lawmakers use this added discretion, even during peri-
ods of economic turmoil, to act conservatively and incrementally. Third,
this Part contends that executive pay reform operates as a blue pill-a
mechanism for lawmaker diversion and responsibility-shifting. 32 By sin-
gling out and seeking to limit pay for executives at the top of the wealth
pyramid, lawmakers may divert pressure to improve the plight of those at
the bottom via increasing the minimum wage or other redistributive poli-
cies and interventions. This diversion of populist outrage may have nega-
tive consequences for populist corporate constituencies.33 Meanwhile,
this same over-emphasis on executive compensation reform also diverts
attention (arguably to the benefit of corporate managers) from more dis-
ruptive corporate reforms that shift the internal power relationships be-
tween managers and shareholders. Finally, this Part asserts that, despite
the costs of lawmaker opportunism, political behavior may have the posi-
tive impact of mediating economic turmoil. Thus, in order to prevent
greater future inefficiency or backlash, lawmakers may create moderately
inefficient executive compensation rules.
II. LIMITATIONS OF EXISTING THEORIES ADDRESSING
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
A. THE EXECUTIVE PAY DECISION
The board is ultimately responsible for hiring the CEO,3 4 often with
the assistance of an executive search firm. Similarly, the board sets CEO
compensation, often via a compensation committee aided by consul-
tants. 35 The decision to hire a CEO is one of the most important deci-
32. See THE MATRIX, supra note 1.
33. Populist groups include broader stakeholder groups such as employees, unions,
environmental and consumer watchdogs, and communities.
34. Douglas G. Baird, Other People's Money, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1309, 1338 (2008).
Although this article often focuses on the example of CEO pay, similar arguments apply to
other senior executives.
35. In theory, the board manages the modern corporation, yet it delegates manage-
ment authority to the CEO and senior executives. Such delegation to professional man-
agement is necessary to address transaction costs in the complex, modern, multi-division,
publicly-traded company. See generally ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND:
THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977). Meanwhile, the separa-
tion of ownership and control between managers and shareholders creates an additional
set of transaction costs or agency costs. See generally ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER
C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
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sions a board is likely to make. 36 When hiring a new CEO, boards choose
between external and internal candidates exhibiting a wide array of traits
and competencies, such as: integrity, operational skills, financial acumen,
persuasion, communication, accountability, and energy. 37 The board's
primary concern in the competitive marketplace is securing the top candi-
date.38 This aggressive quest for top talent is analogous to the free
agency market in professional sports promoting high compensation
levels.39 In the executive search process for most large companies, com-
pensation is most likely a secondary concern. The CEO compensation
decision can coincide with hiring a new CEO or negotiating with an in-
cumbent CEO. In either case, the CEO compensation decision is gener-
ally protected under the business judgment rule.40
In theory, executive compensation, when used effectively, can reduce
agency costs and promote an array of predetermined corporate goals.41
These performance goals generally fall into two categories: financial and
operational objectives. 42 Examples of financial objectives include: net in-
come; earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization
(EBITDA); earnings per share (EPS); and share price. 43 In addition to
36. Landsberg, supra note 4, at 1.
37. See Heidrick & Struggles, Inside the C-Suite 4-5, http://www.heidrick.com/IC/Pub-
lished/Leadership/ (follow "Inside the C-Suite" hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 20, 2009).
38. See ROBERT H. FRANK & PHILIP J. COOK, THE WINNER-TAKE-ALL SOCIETY 70
(1995).
39. See id. at 71 (asserting that the market for top executive talent resembles free
agency in professional sports and escalates compensation). The hiring of internal candi-
dates may not necessarily lead to significantly lower executive pay because companies must
pay a premium to keep corporate all-stars from being poached by competitors. See id. at
70-71.
40. Where compensation is approved by disinterested and independent directors,
courts will invoke the business judgment rule. The lack of director independence or disin-
terestedness, however, may give rise to entire fairness review, that is, greater judicial scru-
tiny assessing whether executive pay is fair and reasonable. See In re The Walt Disney Co.
Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 52, 73 (Del. 2006) (finding directors' approval of CEO com-
pensation and no-fault termination severance protected by business judgment rule). But
see In re Viacom Inc. S'holder Derivative Litig., No. 602527/05, 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS
2891, at *12 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 23, 2006) (finding plaintiff raised sufficient questions about
the independence of the compensation committee to avoid dismissal under the business
judgment rule). In most public companies the independence and disinterestedness thresh-
olds are easily met. Therefore, the business judgment rule presumption often applies in the
public company context. Accordingly, a plaintiff must show that the compensation in
question constituted a waste of corporate assets, that is, no reasonable relationship to the
value of services rendered. See Beard v. Elster, 160 A.2d 731, 737 (Del. 1960). This is an
extremely high burden for plaintiffs to meet. See id. at 737-39 (upholding disinterested
board approval of stock options where "reasonable businessmen, fully informed, might
differ").
41. See Marcel Kahan, The Limited Significance of Norms for Corporate Governance,
149 U. PA. L. REV. 1869, 1872-73 (2001) (describing six categories of incentives to align
management and shareholders: "compensation-related, job-preservation-related, liability-
regime-related, future-employment-related .... social-status-related, and internalized").
42. See RiskMetrics Group, Explorations in Executive Compensation 13 (2008), avail-
able at http://www.riskmetrics.com/sites/default/files/RMGExplorationsinExecutiveCom-
pensation20080520Final.pdf.
43. Id. at 13-14. There is considerable disagreement concerning the suitability of cer-




the standard financial performance-based compensation metrics such as
share price, a firm's management, in their discretion, may also establish
operational performance-based metrics such as customer service, product
development, environmental stewardship, legal compliance, and diver-
sity.44 Independent of performance-based objectives, firms have addi-
tional concerns such as recruitment and retention of top executive talent
that inevitably raise pay levels. When setting compensation performance
goals and criteria, some degree of subjectivity is unavoidable. 45 Despite
the existence of complex formulaic approaches to determine executive
compensation, it is virtually impossible to discern the exact value that a
CEO confers on an organization. In this sense, the imponderability of
CEO impact resembles the imponderable impact of executive compensa-
tion reform.
B. ELEMENTS OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
Executive compensation has many moving parts that further compli-
cate its regulation. Accordingly, "[e]ven with enhanced SEC disclosure
requirements, quantifying and evaluating executive compensation today
is a much more difficult proposition than it was twenty years ago."'46
Common elements of executive compensation include: (i) a fixed base
salary; (ii) variable remuneration or bonus schemes, such as long term
incentive plans (LTIPs) and stock options; (iii) perquisites, such as pen-
sions, deferred compensation, insurance schemes, company cars, corpo-
rate jet usage, subsidized mortgages, box seats, and relocation costs; (iv)
severance payments, such as golden parachutes and handshakes; and (v)
charitable contributions. 47 In addition to these examples of recognized
modes of compensation, new modes of remuneration are always develop-
ing.48 While most executive pay derives from a managerial services con-
tract (usually five years or less in duration), discretionary or highly
subjective forms of remuneration are neither uncommon nor uncon-
troversial.49 Whether executive compensation is contractual or discre-
tionary, equity-based or non equity-based, the link to actual executive
performance is never precise. David Walker describes the difficulty
presented by multiple compensation elements:
44. See id. at 14.
45. See Malcolm Gladwell, Most Likely to Succeed, THE NEW YORKER, Dec. 15, 2008,
at 37 (describing the NFL quarterback problem where it is nearly impossible in some pro-
fessional fields to predict how candidates will perform once hired).
46. David I. Walker, The Manager's Share, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 587, 661 (2005).
47. See id.
48. See Susan Lorde Martin, Executive Compensation: Reining in Runaway Abuses-
Again, 41 U.S.F. L. REV. 147, 148 (2006) ("Corporate compensation consultants noted that
whenever the government put limits on executive compensation, corporations automati-
cally restored the lost benefits through alternative means.").
49. See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UN-
FULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 95-111, 132-35 (2004) (discussing dis-
cretionary severance, retirement grants, and perquisites).
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Today executive stock options have supplanted cash salary as the
largest single component of the average large company CEO's pay
package, but options are only a small part of the picture. Modern
CEO compensation packages include cash, options, restricted stock,
phantom stock and options, a wide variety of bonus opportunities,
not to mention an ever-expanding array of benefits and perks, many
of which, such as SERPs and deferred compensation plans, represent
significant financial commitments by shareholders.5 0
To be fair, new Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) rules re-
quire companies to disclose "fair value" expenses "for all forms of equity
compensation, including options, in their financial statements. '51 Prior to
these rules, "stock options were the most common equity vehicle due to
their favorable accounting treatment. '52 As a result of the new FASB
rules, companies are reevaluating whether to use a greater mix of equity
incentives (for example, restricted stock).5 3 However, an added effect of
"dividing compensation between salary, bonuses, perks, golden
parachutes, and the like tends to reduce salience and outrage and permit
greater overall [managerial] appropriation. '54
C. PREVAILING THEORIES TO CONSTRAIN EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
The overwhelming majority of legal scholarship dedicated to executive
compensation has focused on either aligning incentives of directors, who
set executive pay packages, with shareholder interests or combating ex-
cessive pay levels. Given the perverse incentives of management, there is
little doubt shareholders and the public have reason to question executive
compensation approved by boards. However, shareholders and the pub-
lic should also question the motivations of lawmakers behind the wave of
executive compensation reform over the past two decades. Just like pri-
vate actors, lawmakers are not immune from perverse incentives that
compromise their ability to earnestly address executive compensation is-
sues. Accordingly, the impact of flawed lawmaker diagnoses and recom-
mended treatments is an under-explored dimension of the ongoing
executive compensation discussion. This Article fills this critical gap in
the legal literature.
There are three commonly used theories analyzing executive compen-
sation: (i) the market forces theory; (ii) the optimal contracting theory;
and (iii) the managerial power theory.55 In general, these theories prima-
rily target agency costs at the firm level, but they do not adequately ac-
50. Walker, supra note 46, at 661.
51. RiskMetrics Group, supra note 42, at 18-19 (discussing ACCOUNTING FOR
STOCK=BASED COMPENSATION, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 123
(Fin. Acct. Std. Bd. rev. 2004)).
52. Id. at 19.
53. See id.
54. Walker, supra note 46, at 634-35 ("This can be thought of as a 'divide and prosper'
strategy.").




count for lawmaker rent-seeking and political effects.56 Moreover, there
is both a firm level agency cost and an external public accountability di-
mension of the executive compensation issue. The latter dimension, how-
ever, is often ignored by existing theories.
1. Market Forces Theory
The market forces theory contends that "there is an overriding cap on
managerial value extraction that is determined by external market
forces-markets for corporate control, capital, products, and even the
managerial labor market. '' 57 These "[e]xternal market forces, however
... permit considerable slack, leaving one to question the extent to which
such forces actually limit appropriation. '58 One form of potential appro-
priation is excessive executive pay. Although important, market disci-
pline alone is an insufficient constraint.
The CEO labor market is not robust.59 For example, "[t]he number of
candidates that a Fortune 500 firm would consider in a CEO search would
be few, and the number of openings each year, although perhaps growing,
is few as well."'60 Also, the CEO selection process involves search costs,
internal politics, social pressure, and often requires secrecy and confiden-
tiality.61 These factors often impair labor market efficiency. 62 Another
key factor undermining external market discipline as a check on execu-
tive compensation is the lack of transparency concerning managerial ap-
propriation.63 As a result, the need for managers to preserve their
reputations is an inadequate check on CEO salaries. 64 Kenneth Lay,
Dennis Kozlowski, and Bernie Ebbers all had sterling reputations until
irregularities were uncovered years later.65
The market for corporate control is also an insufficient form of external
56. The managerial power theory does recognize exogenous forces such as outrage
that act as a constraint on managerial discretion, but in a general way.
57. Walker, supra note 46, at 592.
58. Id. at 592-93. But see Mark J. Loewenstein, The Conundrum of Executive Com-
pensation, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 19 (2000) (arguing that neither high levels of execu-
tive pay nor the wage gap should be a concern because the market operates effectively);
Nicholas Wolfson, A Critique of Corporate Law, 34 U. MIAMI L. REV. 959, 975-78 (1980)
(arguing that excessive compensation does not exist and that the market operates suffi-
ciently); see also Randall S. Thomas, Explaining the International CEO Pay Gap: Board
Capture or Market Driven?, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1171, 1265-67 (2004) (arguing that there are
various market conditions besides board capture creating large wage differences, such as
the tournament driven labor market, asymmetric bargaining power, CEO risk tolerance,
and overall firm valuation).
59. See Walker, supra note 46, at 608.
60. Id. (footnotes omitted).
61. Id. (footnotes omitted); see also RAKESH KHURANA, SEARCHING FOR A CORPO-
RATE SAVIOR: THE IRRATIONAL QUEST FOR CHARISMATIC CEOs 32-48 (2002).
62. See Walker, supra note 46, at 608.
63. See KHURANA, supra note 61, at 32.
64. See Walker, supra note 46, at 608.
65. See, e.g., Anthony Bianco et al., The Rise and Fall of Dennis Kozlowski, BUSINESS
WEEK, Dec. 23, 2002, at 64; Darem Fonda, After Bernie, Who's Next?, TIME, Mar. 21, 2005,
at 44; Shaheem Pasta, Enron Founder Ken Lay Dies, CNNMONEY.COM, July 5, 2005, http://
money.cnn.com/2006/07/news/newsmakers/lay-death/.
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discipline. 66 The effectiveness of the market for corporate control re-
quires transparency and manager appropriation to be reflected in the
share price. 67 If these conditions were met, one might expect that manag-
ers who failed to maximize value would face the external risk of removal
from takeover even in the absence of board action. 68 There is evidence,
however, suggesting that the takeover market is cyclical, characterized by
high costs, 6 9 and influenced by impediments like poison pills and the
availability of credit. 70 As a result, the market for corporate control is an
inadequate restraint on managerial appropriation.
Finally, manager appropriation via compensation may not impact eq-
uity or debt markets to a significant degree because "mature public com-
panies rarely make equity offerings" and the level of appropriation is not
"large enough to affect a company's risk of insolvency [or] debt rating. '71
Because markets may not adequately constrain managers, investors rely
on corporate governance that includes the selection of executives and
their compensation as a disciplining mechanism.
2. Optimal Contracting Theory
The optimal contracting theory posits that contracting can effectively
constrain agency costs via contracting with CEOs. 72 The optimal con-
tracting theory assumes that the board is not captured or sufficiently in-
dependent to bargain at arms length.73 This perspective more aptly
describes the scenario where a firm hires an external CEO as opposed to
negotiating with an internal candidate or incumbent CEO. The reality
for most large companies is that there is a CEO firmly at the helm who,
under certain circumstances, exerts significant pressure over the board,
66. See Walker, supra note 46, at 608-09.
67. Id. at 605.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 608-09 & n.59. But see Henry G. Manne, Bring Back the Hostile Takeover,
WALL ST. J., June 26, 2002, at A18 (arguing that the hostile takeover process is the ideal
method to discipline management).
70. Murphy, Politics, supra note 8, at 716.
71. Walker, supra note 46, at 609-10. For similar reasons, product markets are an inad-
equate check on managerial appropriation.
72. Id. at 592. The optimal contracting model can be described as follows:
[T]he principal (the board of directors on behalf of the shareholders) can
only imperfectly observe the effort, focus, and effectiveness of its agent (the
manager) and negotiates a contract that minimizes the resulting agency costs,
that is, the costs of (1) contracting with the manager, (2) monitoring the man-
ager's performance, (3) bonding by the manager to maximize shareholder
value, and (4) the residual slack or divergence that remains between the ac-
tions selected by the manager and those that would optimally benefit the
shareholders.
Id.; see, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976); Edward
E. Lawler III et al., Adding Value in the Boardroom, 43 MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. 92, 92
(2002) ("[B]oards must have three key ingredients in order to be effective: knowledgeable
members, up-to-date company information and the power to counterbalance the CEO.").
73. See Walker, supra note 46, at 592.
2009]
SMU LAW REVIEW
thereby compromising the board's objectivity and independence. 74 This
state of affairs calls into question contractual and discretionary compen-
sation arrangements between corporate boards and CEOs. 75 Accord-
ingly, the optimal contracting theory allows too much "slack" for rent
extraction. 76
3. Managerial Power Theory
The managerial power theory assumes that board members are "imper-
fect agents of shareholders" and therefore reaching optimal contracts
with managers is not always realistic. 77 Proponents of this managerial
power perspective often contend that mechanisms such as enhanced
shareholder voting may be necessary to control pay.78 Board members
have relatively weak financial incentives to maximize firm value and
often yield to executives who exercise significant influence over the board
nomination process and remuneration. 79 The board's appropriation,
74. See id. at 633. The Disney saga is an extreme illustration of this scenario. See
FRANK & COOK, supra note 38, at 67.
75. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 49, at 61-79; Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M.
Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 71, 71 (2003);
Charles M. Elson, Executive Overcompensation-A Board-Based Solution, 34 B.C. L. REV.
937, 985 (1993) (asserting that the overcompensation problem is in part created by direc-
tors' failure to monitor and bargain). This added suspicion is most warranted in situations
involving a sitting CEO versus an external new hire.
76. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 49, at 62-63.
77. Walker, supra note 46, at 633; see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried &
David I. Walker, Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Com-
pensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 755-56 (2002) (asserting that the executive compensa-
tion process is not optimal (that is, arms length) because executives use their influence to
affect compensation packages); WARREN E. BUFFETr, THE ESSAYS OF WARREN BUFFETr:
LESSONS FOR CORPORATE AMERICA 38-39 (1997) (asserting that there is often a lack of
real arm's length transactions between boards and executives); cf John E. Core, Wayne R.
Guay & Randall S. Thomas, 2005 Survey of Banks Related to the Law: Is U.S. CEO Com-
pensation Inefficient Pay Without Performance?, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1142, 1159 (2005) (as-
serting that arm's length transactions are possible in theory only); Franklin G. Snyder,
More Pieces of the CEO Compensation Puzzle, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 129, 138 (2003) (argu-
ing that arm's length transactions are not realistic because contracts, in reality, reflect a
system of repeat players with outside relationships); but see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Execu-
tive Compensation: Who Decides?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1615, 1662 (2005) (asserting that even if
there is control over the board, this is not a sufficient problem to warrant reform and
abandon a director-based examination for one by shareholders).
78. See Bainbridge, supra note 77, at 1643-44.
79. Walker, supra note 46, at 633; see David Leonhardt, A Prime Example of Any-
thing-Goes Executive Pay, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2002, at C1 ("During his rise to become one
of the nation's more prominent chief executives, Mr. Kozlowski persuaded his board to
give him hundreds of millions of dollars worth of cash, stock and perquisites."); Phyllis
Plitch, CEO Compensation Survey (A Special Report)-Breaking the Code of Silence,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 10, 2008, at R4 ("'It's camaraderie,' Mr. Hussein [a dissident director
and second-largest stockholder at Quality Systems, Inc.] says, explaining why boards gen-
erally don't challenge management enough on compensation or other issues."); see also
Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Agents with and Without Principals, 90 AM.
ECON. REV. 203, 203 (2000) (discussing the "skimming view" of CEO pay); Michael B.
Dorff, Does One Hand Wash the Other? Testing the Managerial Power and Optimal Con-
tracting Theories of Executive Compensation, 30 J. CORP. L. 255, 261 (2005) (describing
data illustrating that managers' exertion of power over the contracting process leads to
excessive compensation).
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however, is not limitless, as David Walker asserts:
Under the managerial power theory, appropriation by strong manag-
ers is limited by the outrage that excessive appropriation causes
among financial analysts, institutional investors, and other corporate
governance watchdogs. Outside directors are sensitive to this out-
rage, and limit managerial compensation accordingly. As a result,
managers have an incentive to camouflage compensation in order to
limit outrage.8 0
Ultimately, managers "will tend to follow the herd and avoid significant
deviations from industry pay practices, but they will take advantage of
low-salience means of extracting additional value."8 1 For example, forms
of grant date manipulation other than illegal options backdating, such as
"spring-loading" and "bullet-dodging," follow this pattern.82 Short of ac-
tual board representation (or ex ante input), institutional investors and
other corporate constituents are limited to the ex post benefits of outrage
and "Monday morning quarterbacking." Although the managerial power
theory improves upon the market forces and optimal contracting theo-
ries, it is far from perfect. All of the above theories fail to adequately
capture the political dimension of executive compensation. There is no
panacea for executive compensation problems, and any potential solution
must incorporate political effects.
III. CREDENCE CHARACTERISTICS IN THE
CORPORATE REFORM CONTEXT
A. A DEFINITION OF CREDENCE CHARACTERISTICS AND SERVICES
8 3
Generally, there are three types of goods and services: (i) search goods
and services; (ii) experience goods and services; and (iii) credence goods
and services. 84 The quality of search goods, such as clothing, footwear,
and jewelry, can readily be discerned during the search process prior to
consumption.85 Search goods have "low pre-buying costs of quality de-
80. Walker, supra note 46, at 592; see also Bebchuk, Fried & Walker, supra note 77, at
757 (discussing outrage as a factor in determining legitimate and acceptable compensation
schemes). The discussion of outrage acknowledges the importance of external forces on
managerial rent seeking, but does not directly address lawmaker rent seeking.
81. Walker, supra note 46, at 634.
82. See RiskMetrics Group, supra note 42, at 18. "Spring-loading" involves "making
grants before releasing 'good' news likely to boost the stock price." Id.; see also M.P.
Narayanan et al., The Economic Impact of Backdating Executive Stock Options, 105 MICH.
L. REV. 1597, 1601-05 (2007). "Bullet-dodging" involves "making grants after the release
of 'bad' news" likely to reduce share price. RiskMetrics Group, supra note 42, at 18. Al-
though these forms of option grant date manipulation are not illegal, like backdating, they
are nonetheless discouraged by the investor community and best practice guidelines. See
id.
83. This Article asserts that corporate reform is a service, but, whether considered a
service or good, the following analysis will not change. Cf. U.C.C. § 2-105 (2005)
(providing a definition of goods).
84. Victor Fleisher, Brand New Deal: The Branding Effect of Corporate Deal Struc-




tection. ' 86 On the other hand, the quality of experience goods is not dis-
cerned during the search process, but rather after consumption. 87
Experience goods have "high pre-buying costs of quality detection," but
low post-buying costs. 88 Examples of experience goods include jobs,
movies, newspapers, wine, and food. 89 The third category of goods,
credence goods, was first identified by Michael Darby and Edi Karni. 90
The quality of credence goods cannot fully be determined even after the
search process and consumption. 91 Credence goods have "high pre-buy-
ing costs and high post-buying costs of quality detection. '92 Certain types
of services are more likely to fall into this third category. Examples in-
chide health services, child day care, religious or spiritual guidance, and
corporate reform. 93
There is an important distinction between credence services and
credence characteristics. 94 Credence characteristics are qualities that
cannot be detected through inspection or ordinary use. 95 A good or ser-
vice may include any mixture of search, experience, and credence charac-
teristics. 96 On the other hand, credence services are services for which
the customer's decision-making is dominated by credence characteris-
tics. 97 Credence services, like credence characteristics, manifest "an
asymmetry between seller and buyer with respect to knowledge acquisi-
tion" concerning service value. 98 In the credence service context, assess-
ments of value will either be impossible to determine or require costly
information and other proper circumstances. 99 The term "[o]ther proper
circumstances" in this context applies to situations where the lapse of a
considerable period of time may reveal the value of the service. 100 Situa-
tions involving the passage of considerable time also reveal the thin line
that can exist between credence and experience services.101 Similarly, a
86. MEN-ANDRI BENZ, STRATEGIES IN MARKETS FOR EXPERIENCE AND CREDENCE
GOODS 2-3 (2007); see also Darby & Karni, supra note 25, at 68-69 (discussing Nelson's
characterization of search and experience goods); Philip Nelson, Information and Con-
sumer Behavior, 78 J. POL. ECON. 311, 311 (1970) (analyzing consumer behavior with re-
spect to search and experience goods).
87. See Darby & Karni, supra note 25, at 68.
88. BENZ, supra note 86, at 2.
89. Id.
90. See Darby & Karni, supra note 25, at 68.
91. BENZ, supra note 86, at 2.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Esben Sloth Anderson, The Evolution of Credence Goods: A Transaction Ap-
proach to Product Specification and Quality Control (MAPP - Ctr. for Research on Cus-
tomer Relations in the Food Sector, Working Paper No. 21, 1994), available at http://130.
226.203.239/pub/mapp/wp/wp2l.pdf.
95. Id.
96. Paul N. Bloom & James E. Pailin, Jr., Using Information Situations to Guide Mar-
keting Strategy, 12 J. CONSUMER MKTG. 19, 20 (1995).
97. Anderson, supra note 94, at Executive Summary.
98. Id.
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particular reform's effectiveness may become apparent after the passage
of time. The sixteen year legacy of I.R.C. § 162(m) is a prime example. 10 2
The above-mentioned information asymmetries create strong incentives
for opportunistic seller behavior and supply-side inefficiencies. 10 3 These
risks are enhanced where a monopolist supplier is involved because the
consumer has limited alternatives.'0 4
There are two types of asymmetry implicated by credence characteris-
tics. 10 5 The first type involves the customer's inability to know their
needs or diagnose their problem.10 6 The second type of asymmetry in-
volves the customer's inability to determine the level of service neces-
sary.107 The interplay between these concepts exacerbates the customer's
dilemma because "consumer ignorance and [the] additional cost of sepa-
rate diagnosis and repair provide motivation for a service firm to defraud
its customers.' u0 8
In the corporate law context, lawmaker incentives to reform may disap-
pear where no transfer of political goodwill is involved.' 0 9 Accordingly,
there is a greater need to discipline lawmakers. In a sense, lawmakers are
monopolist suppliers and the market for political capital is too imperfect
to serve as an adequate restraint on the fraudulent expert or incompetent
expert problems." 0 While political capital cannot be expressed in a mon-
etary value, it nonetheless is an important measure of lawmaker utility."'
Generally, there is less political risk associated with moderate regulation,
whereas significant regulation poses greater political risks. However,
contextual factors may alter lawmaker risk profiles. Corporate
lawmakers with the exclusive authority to regulate may choose standards
that are too lax or too onerous to ensure positive corporate performance.
102. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
103. Id. See Emons, supra note 29, at 107. The classic pig-in-poke phenomenon recog-
nizes the act of information suppression. See Anderson, supra note 94, at 2 (citing George
A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84
Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970)); see also Wendy Wagner, Using Competition-Based Regulation to
Bridge the Toxics Data Gap, 83 IND. L.J. 629, 637 (discussing adverse selection and quality
detection).
104. GERAINT HOWELLS & STEPHEN WEATHERILL, CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW 3 (2d
ed. 2005).
105. Brian Roe & Ian Sheldon, Credence Good Labeling: The Efficiency and Distribu-




108. Darby & Karni, supra note 25, at 77.
109. See Emons, supra note 29, at 107 (asserting that a service person "may not perform
an urgently needed repair if other activities are more profitable").
110. In the monopolist scenario, the consumer does not search. Ting Liu, Credence
Goods Markets with Conscientious and Selfish Experts 6 (Boston Univ. Dep't of Econ.,
Working Paper No. 58, 2006), available at http://www.bu.edu/econ/workingpapers/working
papers_2006.html (follow "Credence Goods Markets with Conscientious and Selfish Ex-
perts" hyperlink). It is important to note that consumers must contend with the fraudulent
expert problem as well as the incompetent expert problem.




Accordingly, lawmaker opportunism may cause corporate constituent
welfare losses.
B. PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY AND THE POLITICAL
SUPPORT MAXIMIZATION MODEL
The political support maximization model of public choice theory is a
useful paradigm to analyze executive compensation reforms in context,
and also to predict when the interests of certain corporate constituencies
are likely to prevail in regulatory outcomes. 112 Public choice theorists
generally assume political actors, like private market actors, are mainly
self-interested and that the pursuit of lawmaker self-interest may result in
government failure, that is, inefficient policies. The analysis of credence
services supplements the public choice framework by analyzing how the
unobservable impact of regulatory output facilitates greater lawmaker
discretion.
The federal government and Delaware, both arguably monopolist
lawmakers, supply credence characteristic-laden services to various cor-
porate constituents (for example, managers, shareholders, employees,
and other populist groups) in the form of corporate regulation. Despite
the ability of public choice theory to predict which groups are likely to
wield more influence over lawmakers, there often is no clear answer to
how much a specific corporate regulation benefits various corporate con-
stituencies. 113 The answer to the substantive question of quality is com-
plicated because it depends on a number of contextual variables,
including (i) the type of corporate decision at issue-ownership, enter-
prise, or oversight;" 4 (ii) the corporate constituent's vantage point-
management, shareholders, or populist groups; (iii) the desired policy
value-efficiency or fairness;115 (iv) inter-temporal considerations-
short-term versus long-term impact on business value; and (v) the degree
of legal enforcement. In addition to these factors, the corporate reform
quality inquiry is further constrained by credence characteristics. At a
minimum, an adequate assessment of impact necessitates: (i) clear objec-
tives for reform (that is, what executive compensation reform should ac-
112. Political utility maximization is a crucial element in public choice literature. See
generally JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOG!-
CAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962).
113. See Donald C. Langevoort, The Social Construction of Sarbanes-Oxley, 105 MICH.
L. REV. 1817, 1820 (2007) (arguing that "[t]here is no clear-cut answer to the question of
how much SOX benefits investors").
114. See E. Norman Veasey, The Defining Tension in Corporate Governance in
America, 52 Bus. LAW. 393, 394 (1997) (discussing the types of decisions that Delaware
courts address, which include enterprise, ownership, and oversight decisions). Enterprise
decisions are standard decisions made by management, such as the decision to build a
foreign production plant or what products to produce. See id. Ownership decisions in-
volve ownership changes, such as mergers, acquisitions, and corporate takeovers. See id.
Oversight decisions concern managers' monitoring role, such as ensuring that employees
execute their responsibilities in compliance with the law. See id.
115. See Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. 335, 335
(1974).
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complish); and (ii) empirical validation. In the executive compensation
context, the first condition is a political decision that lawmakers have
continually muddled and failed to satisfy, sometimes at the expense of
vulnerable corporate constituents. Without clear objectives, empirical
validation is a speculative exercise.
1. The Market for Political Capital
In the market for political capital there is an exchange between corpo-
rate constituents on the demand-side and lawmakers on the supply-
side.116 Similar to other markets, the group with the most effective de-
mand is most likely to receive the political spoils. 117 Nobel Prize winner
George J. Stigler is credited with laying the groundwork for the economic
theory of regulation. 118 Before embarking on a description of Stigler's
supply-demand apparatus, it is useful to describe the historical anteced-
ents to the economic theory of regulation developed by Stigler and
others. Public interest theory contends that lawmakers regulate in re-
sponse to market inefficiency and inequity.119 This approach assumes
that regulation is efficient as well as costless and that lawmakers are moti-
vated by the public interest. 120 The so-called capture theory reaches the
opposite conclusion. 121 It holds that lawmakers maximize private wealth
instead of social welfare and are captured by private interests.122 Both
the public interest and capture theories understate the complexity of the
political process.
Stigler's economic theory of regulation asserts that the state has a mo-
nopoly on coercive power and may use it to transfer wealth from one
group to another. 123 For Stigler, "the problem of regulation is the prob-
lem of discovering when and why an industry (or other group of like-
minded people) is able to use the state for its purposes, or is singled out
by the state to be used for alien purposes. '124 The two major constituent
groups in Stigler's economic theory of regulation are producers and con-
sumers,12 5 but in the corporate regulation context, groups are more di-
verse and pluralistic, involving managers, shareholders, employees,
activist groups, and communities.1 26 The dominant, although not univer-
sal, view has been that corporate managers prevail in this tournament or
116. Peltzman, supra note 7, at 212.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 211.
119. Posner, supra note 115, at 335.
120. Id. at 336.
121. Id. at 335-36.
122. Id. Peltzman observed, "[w]ithin a decade [by the 1970s], the benign view of regu-
lation as promoter of the general interest had been mainly abandoned. The ascendant
image was of the regulator captured by the regulated." Peltzman, supra note 31, at 822.
123. See George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. 3, 3
(1971).
124. Id. at 4.
125. Peltzman, supra note 7, at 212.
126. See Peltzman, supra note 31, at 822 (noting that subsequent elaborations of Stig-
ler's theory have recognized broader constituencies).
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auction for political spoils.127 A "rational regulator will not ... [aim to]
distribute benefits equally" but "will seek a structure of costs and benefits
that maximizes political returns. ' 128 This, however, does not necessarily
mean lawmakers will invariably favor the groups with the greatest politi-
cal muscle or those who can or desire to incur the transaction costs of
mobilization. The "government as order-taker" analogy is too simplistic
to account for the complex relationship between lawmakers and corpo-
rate constituents. 129 Furthermore, politicians, just like corporate constit-
uents, seek to maximize their own self-interest 1 30 and may seek actions
that enhance their own personal and political goals independent of inter-
est group considerations. Any theory analyzing lawmaker opportunism
must account for: (i) the fact of continued regulation in the face of con-
siderable business opposition; and (ii) public interest motivations.13'
2. Exogenous Factors Shifting Political Balance
The important question is not simply whether a supply-demand frame-
work or interest group dynamics act as a constraint on lawmaker behav-
ior,132 but instead, what are the conditions under which corporate
managers are not likely to prevail? Corporate scandals and "economic
disruptions often change the distribution of political power and create
opportunities for public policy entrepreneurs to rearrange things to their
advantage."'1 33 Diffuse constituencies, despite lacking organization, may
nonetheless participate in the political process when they are provided
with "free (and easy to digest, perhaps entertaining) information" and
"political saliency, a major national issue that commands attention and
motivates action in the absence of political organization.' 1 34 Executive
compensation is the most politically salient corporate governance is-
sue. 35 Rationally ignorant voters, concerned about macro economic per-
formance" may respond by favoring executive pay reform policies, even if
such policies have a trivial impact on the national economy or their own
personal circumstances. 136 This scenario results in modest cyclical quick
fixes-a band-aid instead of stitches or vice versa.
127. See Peltzman, supra note 7, at 212 (discussing the economic theory of regulation
developed by Stigler and others); see also Stigler, supra note 123, at 3 ("[A]s a rule, regula-
tion is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit.").
128. Peltzman, supra note 7, at 231.
129. Peltzman, supra note 31, at 828.
130. Id. at 822.
131. See id. at 827-28 (asserting that the theory of regulation must take into considera-
tion industry resistance to regulation and industry interests).
132. See Peltzman, supra note 7, at 240.
133. Sam Peltzman, The Economic Theory of Regulation After a Decade of Deregula-
tion, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC Acrivrry: MICROECONOMICS 1, 58 (William C.
Brainard & George L. Perry eds., 1989).
134. Id. at 51-52.
135. Corporate Law-Fiduciary Duties of Directors, 119 HARV. L. REV. 923, 923
(2006).
136. See Peltzman, supra note 133, at 52.
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For lawmakers, the pragmatic outcome to this scenario is a compromise
among various interests, albeit slanted to preserve a broad coalition of
support, thereby maximizing lawmaker utility. As a consequence of these
dynamics, the corporate regulatory framework with respect to executive
compensation is laden with policies that seem economically inefficient
and resemble a placebo rather than a cure. Efficient regulation may lack
political appeal, and at times, merely symbolic or inefficient policies have
more political utility.137
IV. SUPPLY-SIDE INEFFICIENCIES: LAWMAKERS AS
SUPPLIERS OF CREDENCE CHARACTERISTIC-
LADEN SERVICES
In discussing the operation of credence services, it is important to ana-
lyze both the supply and demand aspects of the market. With regard to
the supply-side of the equation, lawmakers provide the service of regula-
tion.138 In the corporate governance context, the suppliers of regulation
are not monolithic and may have separate agendas. 39 The primary sup-
pliers of corporate regulation are Delaware (primarily Delaware state
courts) and the federal government (primarily the Securities & Exchange
Commission (SEC) and Congress). 140 Additional suppliers of corporate
regulation include other government agencies, such as the Internal Reve-
nue Service (IRS), and self-regulatory organizations (SROs), such as the
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the American Stock Exchange
(AMEX), and the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD).141
Despite the existence of numerous lawmakers, this Article focuses on two
lawmaking bodies-Delaware and the federal government, as well as
their "loosely controlled affiliates.' 42 Traditionally, Delaware law has
governed corporate internal affairs, while the SEC has addressed external
issues of securities trading and disclosure. 43 This federal-state lawmaker
137. See Peltzman, supra note 31, at 830; see also Ian Ayres, Supply-Side Inefficiencies
in Corporate Charter Competition: Lessons from Patents, Yachting and Bluebooks, 43 KAN.
L. REV. 541, 558-59 (1995); Douglas M. Branson, Indeterminacy: The Final Ingredient in an
Interest Group Analysis of Corporate Law, 43 VAND. L. REV. 85, 90-92 (1990) (describing
the Delaware corporate bar and its influence on corporate law); William J. Carney, The
Production of Corporate Law, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 715, 724 n.40 (1998).
138. Peltzman, supra note 31, at 823.
139. See id. ("The suppliers in Stigler's theory are unspecified political actors.").
140. See Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV., 588, 592 (2003).
141. SRO rules are subject to approval of the SEC. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(1) (2000). This
list of suppliers or lawmakers reflects traditional corporate law and does not address the
entire landscape of business regulation. See CLARK, supra note 21, § 1.4 (distinguishing
between traditional corporate law and other laws affecting corporations). Examples of
other laws affecting corporations include other types of regulation (for example, environ-
mental, labor, health, and safety regulations). Id.
142. The SEC is accountable to Congress, and SRO's are indirectly controlled by the
SEC. Roe, supra note 140, at 598-600.
143. Id. at 596. There is considerable debate, however, concerning the appropriate bal-
ance. See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of Cor-
porate Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1573, 1605-06 (2005); see also E. Norman Veasey, Shawn
Pompian & Christine Di Guglielmo, Federalism vs. Federalization: Preserving the Division
of Responsibility in Corporation Law, 2005 ABA SEc. Bus. L. COMM. ON FED. REGULA-
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interaction often "determine[s] whose interests and which ideas dominate
American corporate law.' 144 In addition, "[t]he dominant ideas and in-
terests in Delaware differ from those in Washington. ' 145 Despite this po-
tential divergence, the U.S. corporate law regime is, on balance,
conservative.
A. DELAWARE
Delaware's dominance as the premiere situs of incorporation over the
past century has been the subject of vigorous debate. 146 Within Dela-
ware's legal regime, Delaware's judiciary, that is, the Delaware Court of
Chancery and the Delaware Supreme Court, is the primary lawmaking
body, while the Delaware General Assembly plays a secondary role.1 47
Institutional alignment and a stable political climate contribute to Dela-
ware's competitive advantage. 148 The relationship between the Delaware
corporate bar, the General Assembly, the Division of Corporations, and
the judiciary is best described as "symbiotic."'1 49 There is a significant
TION 77, 77 (describing how Sarbanes Oxley blurs the traditional lines between Delaware
and the SEC); see generally Mark J. Loewenstein, The Quiet Transformation of Corporate
Law, 57 SMU L. REV. 353 (2004) (discussing the interplay between state and federal cor-
porate law).
144. Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2491, 2494 (2005). "Thus we
have our first conjecture concerning the federal-state interplay: The interests and ideas at
the two levels differ. In Delaware, two main interests are in play, and they usually would
like the rules to be made in the arena where they jointly have more power." Id. at 2504.
145. Id.
146. See, e.g., ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 37-38
(1993) (explaining the reasons for "Delaware's preeminence in the corporate charter mar-
ket"); William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83
YALE L.J. 663, 664-65 (1974) (describing Delaware besting New Jersey in the market for
corporate charters); Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competi-
tion for Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1064 (2000) (asserting that Delaware
sustains its advantage through judge-made corporate law); Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar,
The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN L. REV. 679, 684 (2002) (arguing
that Delaware is the only state actively courting public company incorporations); Marcel
Kahan & Ehud Kamar, Price Discrimination in the Market for Corporate Law, 86 COR-
NELL L. REV. 1205, 1208 (2001) (asserting that Delaware employs price discrimination
through franchise taxes and litigation-intensive substantive law); Kahan & Rock, supra
note 143, at 1578 (asserting that Delaware and the federal government complement each
other by working on the areas that the other cannot regulate as effectively); Roe, supra
note 140, at 590 (asserting that there can be no pure state-to-state race because of the
threat of federal intervention); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection,
and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 256 (1977) (asserting that state
competition is a race to the top benefiting shareholders).
147. See Fisch, supra note 146, at 1074.
148. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 143, at 1590, 1611-16.
149. See Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate
Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1940 (1998); see also E. Norman Veasey, "I Have the Best
Job in America," DEL. LAW., Winter 1995, at 20, 23 (asserting that the Delaware Supreme
Court has "excellent relations with the other two branches of state government"). E. Nor-
man Veasey, the former Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, commented on
Delaware's cooperative atmosphere:
Delaware's size as the "small wonder" gives us an enormous advantage, par-
ticularly when coupled with the intelligence, approachability, cooperation
and integrity of our public office holders. All three branches of government
in Delaware are keenly aware of the reputation of the judicial branch of gov-
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amount of "collegial interaction" between influential groups in Delaware,
such as the relationship between Delaware's judiciary and the local bar,
as well as the above-mentioned deference the General Assembly gives to
the corporate bar.150 Delaware does not have many legislative pressures
to disrupt the development of law. 15' There is a lack of pressure from
interest groups such as unions, environmental groups, and local commu-
nities.152 Moreover, appointed judges in a plaintiff-driven system are not
as sensitive to interest group pressures.153 This independence arguably
gives Delaware court opinions more legitimacy than some legislative
outcomes.
Delaware is largely insulated from populist concerns, except to the ex-
tent the federal government makes Delaware lawmakers aware.154 Due
to these contextual factors, managers and shareholders are the primary
interest groups influencing Delaware corporate lawmaking. a55 Beyond
managers and shareholders, the federal government can be viewed as an
additional interest group Delaware lawmakers must consider.' 56 In ex-
change for corporate law and judicial arbitration services, Delaware re-
ceives not only political goodwill from corporate constituents, but also a
significant windfall of franchise taxes. 157 In light of this windfall, why
would federal lawmakers tolerate this rent extraction and not attempt to
ernment and of the enormous contribution that the judicial branch makes to
Delaware's economy and to the well-being of our citizens. Delaware's judi-
cial branch must, however, continuously explain and justify its processes to
the other two branches and to the citizenry. We are making that effort. But,
we need the help of the organized Bar, and we need for the other two
branches of government to examine, advise, hear and support us.
Id. at 22.
150. See David A. Skeel, Jr., The Unanimity Norm in Delaware Corporate Law, 83 VA.
L. REV. 127, 160 (1997). William Cary viewed such interaction as problematic. See Cary,
supra note 146, at 687-88.
151. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 143, at 1614.
152. Reincorporating in Delaware does not result in a significant loss of local employ-
ment, which is the case in other states. Carney, supra note 137, at 719. Rarely is Delaware
the principal place of business. See id.
153. Delaware Supreme Court and Chancery Court judges are selected by a bipartisan
judicial nominating commission and are ultimately appointed by Delaware's Governor.
Del. Executive Order No. 4 (Feb. 1, 2001). Moreover, the Delaware State Constitution
mandates a political balance on the Delaware Supreme Court. See DEL. CONST. art. IV,
§ 3. Under Delaware law, directors duties of loyalty and care run to shareholders and not
to remote constituencies. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939). But even within
the existing legal framework, directors have broad discretion to consider outside interests
without triggering liability. See id. at 510-11. In this sense, Delaware law is malleable
enough or provides ample discretion for management to accommodate populist concerns.
See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85
VA. L. REV. 247, 253 (1999); Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public
Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 733 (2005).
154. Roe, supra note 143, at 2501.
155. See id. at 2499 ("Delaware responds primarily and directly to managers and inves-
tors. The stability of the corporate enterprise and of the incumbent actors is foremost in
the Delaware decisionmakers' minds. Congress though deals with more interest groups and
has a conception of the public interest that is wider than just boardroom stability and
shareholder relations.").
156. See id. at 2501.
157. Mark Roe describes the Delaware lawmaking process as follows:
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capture the spoils? 158 Plausible explanations for this phenomenon in-
clude: (i) avoiding blame and shifting responsibility; (ii) the competence
of Delaware lawmakers versus their federal counterparts; and (iii) the
popularity of the Delaware brand with powerful interest groups. 159 Yet
there are times when the federal government is likely to act, usurping
Delaware's authority-periods of economic turmoil or scandal.160
Hence, one could say that investors and managers make Delaware corporate
law and that they then bring in the Delaware judges-selected by bar com-
mittees-to arbitrate their disputes. Other groups and visions are therefore
weaker in Delaware than they would be in an attentive federal forum. Dela-
ware lawmakers do not have to placate employees or environmentalists or
those with an affirmative action agenda. Delaware citizens who might side
with such interests see the financial import of the corporate industry to Dela-
ware, so their dissenting views fade and politicians can ignore them. Nor do
the state-level dynamics alone induce Delaware players to consider policy-
.makers' views of what is best for the American economy. Stated bluntly, if
Delaware made corporate law that simultaneously offended investors and
managers, then those players, who together fully control the reincorporation
decision, could take the big franchise tax pot away from Delaware. For Dela-
ware in the long run, and perhaps even in the short run, everything else is
secondary.
Id. at 2501-02.
158. Mark Roe further describes the significant impact of franchise taxes to Delaware:
The tax is the prize for winning the interstate race, with many seeing it as
bonding Delaware to make good corporate law. The primary focus has been
on the tax as motivating Delaware to do its job well. But bonding-to-quality
isn't all that the tax accomplishes: The tax shapes who matters most in mak-
ing American corporate law. It enhances managers' and shareholders' joint
authority, since they're the players who can take that $500 million annual pot
of gold away from Delaware, while diminishing outsiders' influence.
Id. at 2495.
159. Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic The-
ory of Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REV. 265,
268-69 (1990); see also Omari Scott Simmons, Branding the Small Wonder: Delaware's
Dominance and the Market for Corporate Law, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 1129, 1129 (2008).
Simmons describes federal reluctance to supplant Delaware:
Despite having Commerce Clause powers to preempt Delaware corporate
law, the federal government seems reluctant to exercise these powers. Dela-
ware's brand equity among powerful constituencies (e.g., managers and
shareholders), in part, explains the federal government's reluctance. Dela-
ware's brand strength helps explain the manager and shareholder reluctance,
aversion, or indifference toward greater federal intervention even where fed-
eral law may appear to favor their discrete interests. The federal-state inter-
action story is not simply about Delaware lawmakers fearing preemption.
The federal government (e.g., Congress) also fears a backlash from the cor-
porate manager-investor alliance, which arguably yields the greatest power in
Washington.
Simmons, supra, at 1188.
160. Mark Roe explains the impact of Delaware's failure to act in the midst of corpo-
rate scandals and broader economic turmoil:
When Delaware acts slowly- because, say, its primary interest groups disa-
gree, or the correct policy resolution is unclear, or scandals call for quick
action and Congress moves faster than Delaware-then Delaware's agenda-
setting authority ends, its autonomy shrinks, and American corporate law
goes national. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002-Congress's response to the
Enron-class scandals-is the latest such instance.
Roe, supra note 143, at 2494-95.
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Notwithstanding these periods, federal action is likely moderate and
incremental. Meanwhile, Delaware's responses are measured and con-
servative. Some commentators argue Delaware's corporate law (particu-
larly judicial opinions) is unnecessarily indeterminate as a result of
interest group pressures. 161 Another plausible explanation for this inde-
terminacy is overall corporate complexity. 162 Other commentators con-
tend that Delaware is pro-management and rarely finds directors
personally liable. 163 But, Delaware courts influence corporate conduct
beyond finding liability. As the Disney litigation illustrates,164 even
where a decision does not result in liability for board members, embar-
rassing details of corporate dysfunction may tarnish a company, a board
member, or executive reputations. 65 Reputational risk is another salient
reason for boardrooms to pay attention to Delaware court pronounce-
ments. 66 Edward Rock has described the sermon-like approach of Dela-
ware courts as follows: "The core of my claim is that we should
understand Delaware fiduciary duty law as a set of parables or folktales
of good and bad managers and directors, tales that collectively describe
their normative role. '167 The Disney litigation fits this description. Cor-
porate law sermons, although valuable, exhibit credence characteristics
and their impact is difficult to ascertain.
B. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
Compared to Delaware, federal government lawmaking is more plural-
istic and involves more interest groups reflecting populist concerns. 168
161. See Kamar, supra note 149, at 1943-44.
162. See Eric W. Orts, The Complexity and Legitimacy of Corporate Law, 50 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1565, 1587 (1993) (arguing that corporate law must acknowledge technical
and normative complexity to retain its legitimacy); see also DAVID SKEEL, ICARUS IN THE
BOARDROOM: THE FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS IN CORPORATE AMERICA AND WHERE THEY
CAME FROM 6-10 (2005) (highlighting three enduring issues that stifle regulators: risk tak-
ing, competition, and complexity of organizations).
163. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985); see also Bernard
Black, Brian Cheffins & Michael Klausner, Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV.
1055, 1055-56 (2006) (describing the limited prospect of personal director liability under
U.S. corporate law).
164. See discussion infra Part IV.E.1.
165. See Bruce Orwall & Merissa Marr, Judge Backs Disney Directors in Suit on Ovitz's
Hiring, Firing, WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 2005, at Al; see also Edward B. Rock, Saints and
Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1016 (1997)
("Delaware courts generate in the first instance the legal standards of conduct (which in-
fluence the development of the social norms of directors, officers, and lawyers) largely
through what can best be thought of as 'corporate law sermons.' ").
166. See generally David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV.
1811 (2001) (describing shaming in the corporate context).
167. Rock, supra note 165, at 1016, 1106 ("Delaware courts generate in the first in-
stance the legal standards of conduct (which influence the development of the social norms
of directors, officers, and lawyers) largely through what can best be thought of as 'corpo-
rate law sermons."').
168. See Roe, supra note 143, at 2518-19. Mark Roe describes the broader interests
implicated at the federal level:
More goes on in Washington than wider coalition possibilities. Public-re-
garding policymakers in Washington see themselves as custodians for the
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There is no federal corporation law; however, there are important federal
statutes (that is, the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934) addressing disclosure, insider trading, and periodic report-
ing.169 In addition, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), federalizes
certain aspects of corporate law (for example, the composition of a cor-
poration's audit committee, the separation of accounting and auditing
services, forfeiture of executive pay, and prohibitions on loans to corpo-
rate executives). 170 "[T]he SEC serves both as an enforcer of the federal
securities laws as well as a major policy maker and promulgator of new
securities rules.1 71 When discussing business regulation, commentators
often understate the panoply of other, non-traditional corporate law, reg-
ulations impacting corporations (for example, OSHA, ERISA, the Clean
Air Act, etc.). 17 2 This broader set of regulations may address stakeholder
concerns to a greater degree than the aforementioned federal securities
statutes. There is a federal reluctance to directly regulate the internal
affairs of the corporation (for example, altering existing power relation-
ships between managers and shareholders). 173 Instead, the federal gov-
ernment prefers to use more indirect forms of regulation, such as
disclosure, to prevent political backlash from powerful corporate constit-
uencies. 174  This reluctance or responsibility-shifting by federal
lawmakers results in moderate corporate regulation.17 5
overall health of the American economy; accordingly, they could conclude
that tight managerial accountability-beyond that which even interests insti-
tutional investors-would be best for the economy. The Council of Eco-
nomic Advisors influences the President, the GAO writes reports, and the
SEC often proposes rules that managers and institutional investors dislike.
Of course, we shouldn't natvely think that interests don't influence these
players too, but the interests differ from Delaware's, and sometimes the pub-
lic-policy players have enough slack to be able to act on their ideological
preferences.
Id. at 2503-04.
169. See Roe, supra note 143, at 2498.
170. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 7261-7266 (2006).
171. Kenneth M. Rosen, "Who Killed Katie Couric?" and Other Tales from the World of
Executive Compensation Reform, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2907, 2910 (2008) (describing how
the phenomenon of concurrent reform by multiple regulators presents perils).
172. See CLARK, supra note 21, § 1.4 (distinguishing between traditional corporate law
and other laws affecting corporations).
173. See Roe, supra note 143, at 597.
174. See Macey, supra note 159, at 284, 290.
175. Donald Langevoort's reflections on Sarbanes Oxley reforms reflect this notion of
moderate and incremental change:
To me, the Democratic reform proposals came closer to touching on some of
the real problems in the world of corporate behavior, but in ways that by
themselves still will not change all that much. They are best seen as a shot
across the bow, perhaps saving the heavier ammunition for a time when they
hold a stronger political hand. Sarbanes-Oxley did some very good things,
especially in the accounting and auditing area, but in the end-and notwith-
standing the Sturm und Drang rhetoric-it is still fairly moderate legislation.
Donald C. Langevoort, Managing the "Expectations Gap" in Investor Protection: The SEC
and the Post-Enron Reform Agenda, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1139, 1143 (2003) (discussing the
effectiveness of post-Enron reforms).
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Although there is greater potential for populist concerns to be ad-
dressed at the federal level, increased interest group pluralism does not
necessarily negate manager and shareholder influence. Even if there is
more law on the books, the impact of such provisions is often determined
by the degree of enforcement. 176 Furthermore, there remains a crucial
distinction between public-regarding and earnestly pursuing the public in-
terest. 177 Knee-jerk responses to populist outrage may not qualify as ear-
nestly pursuing the public interest, especially when symbolic measures
are used to mitigate outrage from less informed constituencies. Given
the credence characteristics of corporate reform, federal lawmakers have
greater capability and incentives to camouflage their rent seeking. Fed-
eral lawmaking, subject to its own set of political constraints, has resulted
in a range of responses to the executive compensation problem. The im-
pact of these federal responses illustrate indeterminacy is not unique to
Delaware and may even be a greater problem in the federal context.
C. MAXIMIZING POLITICAL CAPITAL
Corporate constituents pay with votes and other indirect forms of polit-
ical support. 178 Political capital is an important form of currency that is
exchanged between lawmakers and corporate constituents, and its impor-
tance is not undermined by the fact that it is less transparent than prices
in the actual buyer-seller context. Thus, "[tihe currency with which the
demanders bid is obviously a bit more complex than the stuff reported in
the monetary aggregates"; political capital "includes votes delivered in
support of politicians, campaign contributions, jobs in the political after-
life, and so forth.' 79 For corporate constituents like corporate managers,
political capital is an "intangible asset that provides corporations with
long term value extending beyond an isolated policy issue [or dis-
pute]." 80 Similarly, lawmakers seek to maximize political capital by gen-
erating broad political support.
176. See id. at 1141 ("Suffice it to say that, for any number of reasons, there will be no
increase in SEC funding large enough to substantially eliminate the expectations gap.
Sarbanes-Oxley only makes things marginally better.").
177. Mark Roe asserts:
Public-regarding need not, as I am using it here, be identical to being in the
public interest. Congress might react to headlines and want to be seen as
acting on the volatile issues of the day, but without having long-term national
well-being uppermost in mind. Reaching toward the public interest is only a
subset of public-regarding actions. Nevertheless, two broad currents of think-
ing-populist public opinion and productivity-promoting policy--can flood
through Washington and carry Congress away. Neither is as important in
Delaware.
Roe, Delaware's Politics, supra note 143, at 2503-04; see also Roberta Romano, The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521.,
1527-29 (2005) (explaining SOX's shortcomings as a product of crisis-mode legislation).
178. See generally Jill E. Fisch, How Do Corporations Play Politics?: The FedEx Story,
58 VAND. L. REV. 1495 (2005) (describing a case study of FedEx to illustrate the various
ways corporations buy and use political power)
179. Peltzman, supra note 31, at 823.
180. Fisch, supra note 178, at 1498.
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At first glance, it seems rational for lawmakers to target the most valu-
able consumer segment. Yet the credence characteristics of corporate re-
form allow lawmakers to satisfy multiple constituencies simultaneously,
providing lawmakers with a broader set of options to address populist
outrage and market instability. 181 Because credence characteristics make
lawmaker motivations easier to camouflage, corporate constituents, par-
ticularly those with greater informational constraints, find it difficult to
determine clear winners and losers. By the time these corporate constitu-
ents discern the impact of a particular regulation, public outrage has
waned, only to reappear in the future. Here, political incentives and
short-termism may hinder earnest exploration of issues, resulting in mod-
est, incremental, or superficial change. Executive compensation reform
tracks this pattern.
Lawmakers may camouflage unnecessary or superficial reforms, lack of
expertise, incompetence, short-term commitment to an issue, and respon-
sibility.1 82 Interestingly, this creates several dilemmas for corporate con-
stituents. Perhaps the most important dilemma is the enhanced risk that
regulators may manipulate corporate constituents in order to mitigate po-
litical backlash, promote acquiescence, and silence critics without ad-
dressing fundamental flaws or root causes of a particular issue. This
raises the question of how corporate constituents can limit the risk of
manipulation and constrain lawmaker opportunism that leads to subop-
timal reform.
1. The Relevance of Public Opinion
For Adolf Berle, checks on a corporation's economic power include
competition, profits, political intervention, and public consensus or senti-
ment.183 These latter two constraints are particularly relevant to the ex-
ecutive compensation debate. The forces of political intervention and
public opinion may work in conjunction to influence firm performance. 184
181. See BENZ, supra note 86, at 53.
182. See Macey, supra note 159, at 275-78 (discussing how Congress can shift blame by
deferring to federal agencies and, even more so, to state lawmakers); see also Lisa M.
Fairfax, The Rhetoric of Corporate Law: The Impact of Stakeholder Rhetoric on Corporate
Norms, 31 J. CORP. L. 675, 699 (2006) ("First, when viewed in light of its classical meaning,
corporate rhetoric can be characterized as a mechanism designed to persuade relevant
audiences regarding the validity of the corporate enterprise and its agents' behaviors.").
183. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 39, 54, 58
(1954). Similarly, Michael Porter recognizes five forces that limit corporate power. See
MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE STRATEGY: TECHNIQUES FOR ANALYZING INDUS-
TRIES AND COMPETITORS 6 (1980).
184. David Vogel describes the combined impact of public opinion and government
action:
There is a way in which corporations can be forced to make decisions not
dominated by the logic of capital accumulation, but it cannot be achieved
through "corporate accountability." It requires the direct intervention of the
government. At best, corporate activists can supplement government regula-
tion; what they cannot do is substitute for it ..... The corporate challenge
movement has not and, indeed, cannot adequately address these fundamen-
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Public opinion is a crucial component of modern politics; 185 and the
perception of the corporation as a quasi-public institution has elevated
the status of public opinion in the corporate governance arena.1 86 Al-
though the public opinion concept is imprecise, ascertaining general pub-
lic sentiment is an informative exercise for boards, lawmakers, and
academics alike. Public opinion functions as a crude measure of public
legitimacy for corporate governance.187 It tends to be cyclical and in-
tense.1 88 Yet it does not always "spring immaculately or automatically
into people's minds;" it may be partially manufactured.1 89 In and of
themselves, citizen demands may not have a significant impact on corpo-
rate conduct, but such demands are more likely to be successful when
coupled with lawmaker intervention or the threat thereof.190
tal issues because they can only be addressed through the governmental
process.
DAVID VOGEL, LOBBYING THE CORPORATION: CITIZEN CHALLENGES TO BUSINESS Au-
THORITY 225-26 (1978).
185. Murray Edelman describes the amorphous nature of public opinion:
Social change varies crucially both with what particular groups believe about
public issues and with what the public perceives as change. Yet "public opin-
ion" is an exceptionally ambiguous and volatile term and idea. And it is
readily subject to mistaken beliefs about its current or past content. People
with conflicting political aspirations rarely agree on what "public opinion" is
at any particular time and place, and each group's perception is likely to
support its own policy preferences. Because there is no "public" but rather
many different ones that change constantly, this multiplicity of perceptions of
public opinion is inevitable.
MURRAY EDELMAN, THE POLITICS OF MISINFORMATION 52 (2001).
186. See BERLE, supra note 183, at 60 ("The corporation is now, essentially, a nonstatist
political institution, and its directors are in the same boat with public office-holders. If
ever corporate managers base their continued tenure on power and not on reason, the end
is disaster.").
187. As Adolf Berle asserts:
[A] modern American corporation understands well enough that it has a
"constituency" to deal with. If its constituents-notably its buyers-are un-
satisfied, they will go to the political state for solution. Hardly any present-
day board of directors or corporation management would take the position
that it could afford to disregard public opinion-or would last very long if it
did.
Id. at 56-57 (arguing that public opinion is a check on the power of corporations).
188. Id. at 57 ("A disadvantage (not peculiar perhaps to a political as contrasted with
an economic balancing force) is the fact that movements of public opinion tend to be slug-
gish in commencing, and extreme once they start. A situation has to be really out of hand
before public pressure begins to assert itself, and when it does passions run high."); Martin,
supra note 48, at 147 (asserting that concern over executive compensation fluctuates over
time).
189. EDELMAN, supra note 185, at 53.
190. Public opinion undoubtedly impacts lawmaker and corporate manager decision-
making. According to a study of directors, eighty-three percent of directors indicated that
public perceptions of pay had at least a somewhat important impact on executive compen-
sation decisions. See USC CR. FOR EFFECTIVE ORGS. & HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, 10TH
ANNUAL CORPORATE BOARD EFFECTIVENESS STUDY: 2006-2007, at 27, http://www.
heidrick.com/IC/Published/Governance/ (follow "10th Annual Corporate Board Effective-
ness Study (2006-2007)" hyperlink) [hereinafter BOARD EFFECTIVENESS STUDY]; see also
Fairfax, supra note 182, at 693 (asserting that self-generated reports addressing "corporate
responsibility" or "corporate citizenship" reflect a conscious effort by business leaders,
albeit rhetorically, to acknowledge their corporations' obligations to the community).
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D. DIAGNOSING THE PROBLEM: METRICS OF ASSESSMENT FOR THE
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION PROBLEM
The executive compensation debate is plagued by the lack of agree-
ment concerning the proper diagnosis or characterization of the problem.
The credence characteristics of executive compensation reform provide
self-interested lawmakers with greater flexibility to choose a diagnosis of
the executive compensation problem that is the most politically profita-
ble. As a result, lawmaker diagnosis and recommended treatment regi-
mens are at times inconsistent and muddled. But in order to evaluate the
efficacy of executive compensation reforms, it is first necessary to estab-
lish a clear diagnosis of the problem (that is, metrics and goals) upon
which to discern the effectiveness of regulation.
Corporate constituents, from managers to populist groups, view the ex-
ecutive compensation issue differently. 191 In general, the executive pay
problem is articulated from either: (i) an investor protection-agency cost
perspective; 192 or (ii) a public accountability-excessive compensation per-
spective. 193 Historically, the executive compensation debate focused on
excessive pay.194 In more recent history, the problem has been recast in
terms of pay-for-performance. 195 Despite the widespread adoption of
pay-for-performance rhetoric by most legal scholars and the business
community, the political construction of the executive compensation issue
unavoidably implicates both perspectives. This stems from supply and
demand considerations such as: (i) lawmaker attempts to maximize politi-
cal capital; or (ii) in the absence of political intent, lawmaker incompe-
tence and corporate constituency perceptions. Whereas most legal
Mark Roe's description of "backlash" acknowledges the importance of broader public
sentiment beyond the manager-shareholder constituency. See Mark J. Roe, Backlash, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 217, 217 (1998). Lucien Bebchuk acknowledges the direct impact of con-
stituency outrage on executive compensation decisions. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra
note 49, at 65. From Bebchuk's perspective, only powerful constituents, like institutional
shareholders, are likely to influence firm executives. See id. at 50. Bebchuk's description
of outrage does not address the interaction of public outrage with lawmaker intervention
or the threat thereof. See id. at 66.
191. This Article uses the phrase "executive compensation problem" in broad terms to
encompass yet recognize the difference between pay for performance issues versus exces-
sive compensation in an absolute sense.
192. Jensen & Murphy, Performance Pay, supra note 8, at 225-26.
193. See, e.g., Kevin J. Murphy, Top Executives are Worth Every Nickel They Get,
HARV. Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1986, at 125, 125. These two viewpoints often mirror the
ongoing shareholder wealth maximization versus stakeholder debate.
194. See Charles M. Yablon, Bonus Questions: Executive Compensation in the Era of
Pay for Performance, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 271, 271-72 (1999); see also Jensen & Mur-
phy, Performance Pay, supra note 8, at 254-58 (arguing that community sentiment had con-
strained executive pay since the 1930s, decreasing CEO incentives).
195. See, e.g., Andrew R. Brownstein & Morris J. Panner, Who Should Set CEO Pay?
The Press? Congress? Shareholders?, HARV. Bus. REV., May-June 1992, at 28, 28-29 (as-
serting that the major issue is creating pay-for-performance via procedural safeguards in
the compensation committee setting); Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incen-
tives-It's Not How Much You Pay, But How, HARV. Bus. REV., May-June 1990, at 138,
138-39 (arguing for attachment of pay and performance); Murphy, supra note 193, at 125
(asserting that the question of executives being paid too much is the wrong question to ask;
instead, lawmakers should focus on relatedness of pay and performance).
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scholars assume that corporate lawmakers often reject the stakeholder or
public accountability model of corporate governance, the shape of execu-
tive compensation reform illustrates that public accountability concerns
have not been completely disregarded.
1. The Accountability of Corporate Power: Investor Protection and
Public Accountability
Adolf Berle chronicled the development of a new professional class of
manager, envisioning the CEO more as a statesman than a robber
baron. 196 From Berle's perspective, CEOs made a good living, but noth-
ing to rival the wealth of robber barons. 197 The professional CEO class
that Berle envisioned was driven by a strong sense of professional obliga-
tion.198 In light of recent corporate scandals, Berle's initial observations
were perhaps overly optimistic. Despite his overstated optimism, Berle's
characterization of corporate power as the primary issue in corporate
governance is instructive.
The accountability of corporate power remains the threshold issue in
corporate governance, encompassing both an internal and an external di-
mension.199 The internal dimension reflects the promotion of economic
efficiency via preventing managerial abuse at the expense of sharehold-
ers. This is the traditional agency cost analysis. Meanwhile, the second
external dimension reflects a populist uneasiness with the accountability
of corporate power and the need to address negative externalities as well
as broader stakeholder concerns. 200 These two perspectives raise ques-
196. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY: A NEW DEVELOPMENT
IN AMERICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY 3-10 (1959).
197. See id. at 4.
198. See generally id.
199. See id. at 77 ("Power, next to sex and love, is perhaps the oldest social phenome-
non in human history."). Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means, in their seminal book The
Modern Corporation and Private Property, addressed two dimensions of corporate power:
(i) the internal minimization of agency costs resulting from the separation of ownership
and control between diffuse shareholders and executives; and (ii) the external abuse of
corporate power at the expense of society at large. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 35, at
11-13, 17-18.
200. The former perspective has dominated the corporate governance debate in the
United States, whereas the latter has received limited acceptance. See, e.g., Henry
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439,
439-41 (2001) (asserting that shareholder wealth maximization is the dominant corporate
governance paradigm around the world). But see Fairfax, supra note 182, at 680 (providing
a stakeholder definition encompassing any group of individuals impacted by corporate
actions, irrespective of whether such groups desire corporate profit maximization);
Jonathan R. Macey, Fiduciary Duties as Residual Claims: Obligations to Nonshareholder
Constituencies from a Theory of the Firm Perspective, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1266, 1274
(1999) (asserting that non-shareholder interests are often implicated by corporate deci-
sions); Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of Economic
Globalization, 35 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 705, 716 (2002) ("The progressive alternative, which
is derived from the stakeholder theory of the corporation, suggests that corporate manag-
ers' underlying social obligations are more extensive than maximizing shareholders' wealth
within the confines of the law. Specifically, progressive scholars contend that directors ...
ought to consider the implications of their actions on employees, consumers, suppliers (in
some cases), the community, and the environment.").
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tions concerning who is and who should be the targeted audience of exec-
utive compensation reform.
a. Is Executive Compensation Reform a Matter of Agency Costs
and Internal Abuses of Corporate Power?
The pay-for-performance perspective on executive compensation is
consistent with traditional agency cost analysis. It stresses the importance
of using performance-based compensation to align shareholder and man-
ager interests in order to reduce agency costs. 20 1 In practice, aligning pay
with performance often demands less fixed compensation and more vari-
able compensation based upon various performance-related benchmarks
(for example, sales targets, cost reduction, etc.) deemed important to the
firm.20 2 Long term incentive plans (LTIPs), stock options, restricted
stock, and other forms of equity compensation are also used to promote
such alignment. 20 3 Yet aligning pay with performance may not necessa-
rily lower compensation-indeed, it may do the exact opposite. 20 4 If the
idea is to provide incentives for performance, a perfectly plausible out-
come is an increase or ratcheting-up of pay. A number of commentators
assert that the crux of the issue is not the actual level of compensation,
but rather the tenuous link between pay and performance and the lack of
effective procedural mechanisms to constrain abuses of director
discretion. 205
The only way to effectively constrain the absolute level of pay is to
establish a cap. 20 6 However, the agency cost or pay-for-performance de-
bate perspective sidesteps the inquiry into substantive measures, such as
capping pay to constrain executive compensation, and instead defaults to
the presence of procedural safeguards like shareholder voting, director
independence, and disclosure. This perspective usually does not question
absolute levels of pay provided that fair procedures exist for determining
pay. But according to a joint study by Heidrick & Struggles and the Uni-
versity of Southern California Marshall School of Business, 20 7 approxi-
mately forty percent of directors think executive pay is too high in most
cases, although over seventy-five percent think their own company's
CEO compensation program is effective.208 The virtual impossibility of
201. See Yablon, supra note 194, at 272, 279.
202. See Murphy, Politics, supra note 8, at 721-25.
203. See Walker, supra note 46, at 661.
204. See id. at 634-35.
205. See, e.g., BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 49, at 194.
206. See Murphy, Politics, supra note 8, at 727; Yablon, supra note 194, at 303-07 (advo-
cating a $3 million deductibility cap on total pay).
207. Heidrick & Struggles is "the world's premier provider of senior-level executive
search and leadership consulting services, including talent management, board building,
executive on-boarding and M&A effectiveness." See Heidrick & Struggles, About Us,
http://www.heidrick.com/About/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2008).
208. See BOARD EFFECTIVENESS STUDY, supra note 190, at 26-27. This study used re-
sponses from 768 directors at 660 of the 2,000 largest publicly traded companies in the
United States and is the largest study of its kind. Id. at 2.
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determining the correct absolute pay levels,20 9 in part, explains the pref-
erence among many legal scholars for procedures and the reluctance to
acknowledge the impact of extremely high pay levels, in an absolute
sense, on firm performance.
Excessive pay levels, however, can lower the size of dividends paid to
shareholders, reduce earnings per share, and lead to other forms of orga-
nizational inefficiency. For example, intra-firm salary comparisons be-
tween employees throughout an organization may relate to firm
efficiency goals.210 Organizational theory acknowledges how the per-
ceived unfairness of executive pay (stemming from large pay discrepan-
cies) may have a negative impact on employee morale, turnover,
competitiveness, and profitability. 211 On the other hand, the realistic
prospect of higher pay and rewards most likely increases worker produc-
tivity.212 Finally, poor pay practices may signal broader deficiencies
within the firm, such as a lack of board independence and objectivity. 213
The underlying issue in the above-mentioned examples, however, re-
mains agency costs. 214 Despite the indisputable benefits of aligning pay
with performance, it is unrealistic to expect the removal of all "slack"
from executive pay decisions. A more realistic target is a palatable
amount of slack in light of contextual constraints.
b. Is Executive Compensation Reform a Matter of Public
Accountability and the External Abuse of Corporate
Power?
From the prevailing shareholder protection perspective, as long as
CEO pay is adequately linked to performance measures, there is no ex-
209. See Pay Attention, ECONOMIST, June 14, 2008, at 77. A range of factors are em-
ployed to determine CEO compensation, such as company performance, CEO perform-
ance, pay of CEOs with peer companies, pay of other employees within the company,
company culture, and concern over public perception. See ABA Comm. on Corp. Law,
Corporate Directors Guidebook, 62 Bus. LAW. 1479, 1528-29 (2007). There are also a host
of intangible and contextual factors that may influence the remuneration decision. The
global market for executive talent has not brought down executive pay in the United
States. See Pay Attention, supra. Whereas one would expect lower agency costs in private
equity firms, the salaries for CEOs of private equity firms are even greater than those of
publicly traded companies where agency costs are greater. See id.
210. See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Fairness, Minimum Wage Law, and Employee Benefits, 77
N.Y.U. L. REV. 47, 55 (2002). The more generalized comparisons of executive pay to aver-
age U.S. worker salaries has a socio-economic fairness dimension. Id.
211. George A. Ackeloff & Rachel E. Kranton, Identity and the Economics of Organi-
zations, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 9, 19-22 (2005); Jolls, supra note 210, at 48, 55 (arguing that
workers respond positively to fair wage behavior; that is, higher pay leads workers to work
harder); Donald C. Langevoort, Opening the Black Box of "Corporate Culture" in Law and
Economics, 162 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 80, 86-87 (2006); Susan J. Sta-
bile, One for A, Two for B, and Four Hundred for C." The Widening Gap in Pay Between
Executives and Rank and File Employees, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 115, 142 (2002) ("This
perception [of unfairness] has adverse consequences in terms of morale, productivity, ab-
senteeism, and turnover.").
212. See Jolls, supra note 210, at 52.
213. See Bebchuk & Fried, Agency Problem, supra note 75, at 77.
214. Id. at 71.
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cessive pay problem.2 15 This perspective, however, does not adequately
capture the range of lawmaker motivations or the politically constructed
meaning of executive compensation reform.2 16 Another key dimension
of the executive pay problem maintains that excessive pay is about fair-
ness to broader non-shareholder constituencies such as employees.217 At
a basic level, people interpret fairness by looking at the pay of others, and
when they witness a gap they perceive unfairness, irrespective of how ra-
tional the sentiment.218 This dimension of executive compensation re-
form is an outgrowth of the external perception of corporations as quasi-
public institutions that should be subject to accountability measures re-
sembling those found in government, such as transparency, accountabil-
ity, and the participation of external voices. 219 With respect to executive
compensation reform, "it is entirely possible that deeper instincts about
the modern corporation as a politically accountable institution played a
role" in the adoption of various measures. 220 The accountability of cor-
porate power to external non-shareholder constituencies is an undeniable
undercurrent of executive compensation reform.221 This stakeholder-ori-
ented perspective is often criticized because the more stakeholder con-
215. See Stabile, supra note 211, at 117.
216. See Langevoort, supra note 113, at 1820.
217. Stabile, supra note 211, at 157 ("To attempt to establish an acceptable pay ratio,
we need to identify what is a reasonable compensation ratio in terms of the goals we are
seeking to attain, i.e., addressing employees' perception of fairness and achieving a rela-
tionship in pay that we believe is socially just."). Nonetheless, the difficulty of casting the
executive compensation problem solely in terms of excess gives rise to a number of issues,
namely, the lack of agreement on what is excessive, the appropriate benchmark for com-
parison, and, even if one assumes public accountability is a problem, the appropriate
remedy.
218. Stabile, supra note 211, at 142 (asserting that people decide if they are being
treated fairly by looking at others' pay, and when they witness gaps they perceive unfair-
ness); see also Carol Hymowitz, Pay Gap Fuels Worker Woes, WALL ST. J., Apr. 28, 2008, at
B8 ("According to the Congressional Research Service, the average pay for CEOs was
more than 180 times average worker pay, up from a multiple of 90 in 1994"); Alan Murray,
CEOs Get Off the Ropes on Executive Pay, WALL ST. J., July 5, 2006, at A2 ("Today, the
Business Roundtable, a lobbying group of chief executives of 160 of the largest companies
in the U.S., is releasing a study showing the pay of CEOs, while still lush compared to that
of a Starbucks barista, isn't as outrageous as some press reports suggest.").
219. See Langevoort, supra note 113, at 1829 (asserting that SOX regulation is consis-
tent with the emerging conception of the public director).
220. See id. at 1828 (discussing the motivations behind SOX reforms).
221. See Fairfax, supra note 182, at 678 ("[S]ociety, including investors, may find the
stakeholder norm more palatable, particularly during times of corporate misbehavior when
society perceives the profit maximization norm as having generated that behavior."); The-
resa A. Gabaldon, The Story of Pinocchio: Now I'm a Real Boy, 45 B.C. L. REV. 829, 829
(2004) (arguing that "corporate irresponsibility stems from the failure of corporations to
address the concerns of non-shareholders and the failure of shareholders and regulatory
watchdogs to look beneath the corporate surface"); Dalia Tsuk Mitchell, From Pluralism
to Individualism: Berle and Means and 20th-Century American Legal Thought, 30 L. &
Soc. INQuIRY 179, 180 (2005) (arguing that Berle and Means' seminal book, The Modern
Corporation and Private Property, raises questions concerning the accountability of corpo-
rations to society at large).
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cerns are implicated, the less discipline it arguably exerts on managers.222
Notwithstanding these concerns, Adolf Berle and other commentators
described the modem corporation as a major social institution rivaling
government institutions.223 The modern corporation touches virtually
every aspect of contemporary life, and yet the accountability and expecta-
tion of democratic procedures that citizens expect from government are
not necessarily reflected in the modern corporation.224 This accountabil-
ity gap, during periods of crisis, often translates into negative public opin-
ion, outrage, or backlash among populist constituencies. 225 The judgment
of the marketplace that Adam Smith touted in the eighteenth century did
not contemplate the scope and scale of the modem corporation that
Berle witnessed. 226 The notion of the corporation as a public institution
and increasing citizen pressures have "helped politicize the [corporate]
environment" and the executive pay debate.227 These pressures are "a
reflection of widespread public mistrust of both business and
222. Langevoort, supra note 113, at 1833 (describing the major criticism of stakeholder
approaches as making firm accountability open-ended and allowing managers to easily jus-
tify self-interested actions).
223. See Norton E. Long, The Corporation, Its Satellites, and the Local Community, in
THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 202, 202 (Edward S. Mason ed., 1959). For some
commentators, "[t]he large corporation takes its place along with the church and the armed
services as an organization that transcends the local territory and cuts across political
boundaries, at times even those of the nation and state." Id. at 202 ("For some of the
members at least, the corporation represents a value-laden institution that outranks the
local community as a focus of loyalty and a medium for self-realization.").
224. Berle's observations were not unique:
The corporate accountability movement represents an attempt to realize in
practice what scholars such as Latham, Dahl, and others have argued in the-
ory-namely that corporations wield the power of governments and should,
therefore, be treated like governments. The movement is accurately de-
scribed as a movement for corporate accountability because its basic thrust is
to make corporate officials as responsive to those affected by their decisions
as are elected officials. By reviving the symbols and mechanisms of corpo-
rate governance-the annual meeting, the annual report, the proxy resolu-
tions, the board of directors-the advocates of corporate accountability are
attempting to make the relationship between the officials of the private sec-
tor and the public resemble more closely that between government officials
and their constituencies.
VOGEL, supra note 184, at 6-7.
225. See id.
226. Berle recognized that "in addition to market power, the large corporation exer-
cises a considerable degree of control over nonmarket activities of various sorts." Edward
S. Mason, Introduction, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY, supra note 223, at 1,
4; see also BERLE, supra note 183, at 37 ("The [judgment of the market place] assumption
was made by Adam Smith in 1776 in the Wealth of Nations, and has been steadily carried
forward. The point of importance is that the assumption has lost most of its validity in mid-
twentieth century."). Berle openly asserted: "For practical purposes, the judgment of the
market place in relation to application of capital has little application in the greatest and
most dynamic areas of American industry." Id. at 40. In light of the complexity of the
modern corporation, Berle asserted that the study of the modern corporation should not
be limited to legal analysis, but rather, it should embrace a more interdisciplinary approach
utilizing social science (that is, politics, economics, history, sociology, etc.) to capture the
essence of corporate impact. See Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Foreword, in THE CORPORATION IN
MODERN SOCIETY, supra note 223, at ix, ix-xi. Nonetheless, some commentators adopt a
form of market fundamentalism even Adam Smith would hesitate to endorse.
227. VOGEL, supra note 184, at 226-27.
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government. '228
Executive compensation has an important symbolic link to discussions
of broader economic turmoil, such as the wage gap, unemployment, and
outsourcing, as well as the sub-prime mortgage crisis and stock market
bubbles. Executive compensation, like the wage gap, is often invoked as
a societal litmus test for fairness. Indeed, statistics demonstrating that
Fortune 500 executives make 364 times that of the average worker unde-
niably raise eyebrows and a range of emotions from envy to disdain. 229
Such headlines heighten populist concern that large corporations are self-
perpetuating plutocracies accountable only to themselves at the expense
of workers and other populist constituencies. From a broad social per-
spective, some commentators contend that societal rewards are warped
and that CEOs are overcompensated when one compares his or her soci-
etal contribution to entrepreneurs, such as Bill Gates, who promote job
creation, while other CEOs do not.230 Furthermore, these commentators
argue that excessive executive compensation has broader negative eco-
nomic impacts because an unreasonable amount of talented people will
flock to business schools instead of pursuing other professions, thereby
reducing the talent pool for other professions.2 31
Linking the executive pay debate closely to worker or populist interests
highlights the tension between a more libertarian view of the corporation
versus the corporation as a quasi-public institution. Every company, in-
cluding nonprofits, has the goal of controlling expenses, and senior man-
agers have discretion to pursue multiple cost reduction strategies, such as
228. Id. (emphasis added). Despite growing citizen demands for public accountability,
commentators argue this perspective is problematic:
The notion of the corporation as a public institution or private government
is both informative and misleading. It is informative in that it illuminates the
extent to which the social impact of the corporation does resemble that of a
government. But it is deceptive to the extent that it obscures the inability of
the corporation to command compliance with its decisions. The reason that a
corporation, unlike a democratically elected government, cannot be politi-
cally accountable to those affected by its decisions, is because the most im-
portant decisions made by any firm are out of the control of those who
govern it; they are dictated by the imperatives of a market economy.
Id. at 225.
229. See Robert B. Reich, CEOs Deserve Their Pay, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 2007, at A13.
230. EDELMAN, supra note 185, at 16-17 ("As a result of the focus on image rather than
social contribution and the highly disparate and inequitable returns to workers it is highly
unlikely that a system that rewards merit will ever be instituted in countries such as the
United States, in which corporate power has become dominant both in the economy and in
the public realm. In this key respect things can only get worse, because rewards, punish-
ments, and incentives generally are warped."); Vito Tanzi, Tax System Reform Can Address
Unrest over High Pay, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 2, 2007, at 15 ("Market economies derive
their legitimacy and political support from the belief that the incomes received by those
who operate in them reflect their contributions to the economy."); Yablon, supra note 200,
at 301; but see John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay & Randall S. Thomas, Is U.S. CEO Compen-
sation Inefficient Pay Without Performance?, 103 MICH. L. REv. 1142, 1165-66 (2005) (as-
serting that U.S. executives have performed in a manner worthy of some commendation,
even as the market dropped, because compared to European and Asian company losses,
the U.S. companies still had superior performance by losing less).
231. A similar claim can be made for the legal profession and professional sports. See
FRANK & COOK, supra note 38, at 3, 6, 108-09.
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layoffs, retraction of employee benefits, outsourcing, and industry exit.
Ironically, a CEO's pursuit of cost reduction strategies, such as layoffs
and the achievement of cost reduction targets, often lead to greater com-
pensation. In most major companies, job creation is not a direct goal and
labor is merely viewed as a factor of production.232 For many companies,
the appropriate role of the corporation is to produce goods and services
society values en route to maximizing shareholder wealth-not job crea-
tion or employment guarantees. 233 The employee-at-will doctrine charac-
terizes most modern employment arrangements and the power of
organized labor has waned over the past several decades. 234 Barring self-
employment, employees have no expectation of employment security-
only a portable 401(k) plan. Despite public accountability concerns, the
prevailing trend reflects a more libertarian corporation.
E. LAWMAKER REFORM SERVICES
Despite the difficulties with diagnosing the executive pay problem
presented in the preceding Sections, corporate lawmakers undoubtedly
find the diagnosis of executive pay problems significantly easier than de-
signing effective policies and reforms. The matrix of current executive
compensation reform policies is a prime example of this difficulty. This
Section explores the current shape of executive compensation reform and
its limitations. The collective impact of these executive compensation re-
forms is imponderable.
1. Judicial Arbitration Services
Generally, courts are reluctant to weigh-in on executive pay issues ex-
cept where payment constitutes waste and bears little relationship to per-
formance.2 35 Judges recognize the difficulty of articulating a concise set
of rules and the ex post second guessing of business decisions with a
strong operational component, like executive compensation.2 36 Where
the board is sufficiently independent and disinterested, the business judg-
ment rule provides significant managerial discretion.237 The epic Disney
232. See Stabile, supra note 211, at 171. Some commentators find this worker indiffer-
ence troubling. Id. ("We are not looking to eliminate pay disparities, but to eliminate
undeserved disparities. Implicit in that may be the need to develop a different notion of
employees, viewing them as important stakeholders in the company.").
233. Former General Electric CEO Jack Welch expresses this sentiment:
You can look at it any way you want and I don't care what you say. We had
425,000 employees and $25bn of business. When I left we had 310,000 and
$125bn, five times the revenue, 25 per cent fewer people. So, were we too
bad [as an organization], or was I Neutron Jack?
Francesco Guerrera, 01' Blue Eyes Is Not Coming Back, FIN. TIMES (London), July 26,
2008, at 3.
234. See generally Michael L. Wachter, The Rise and Decline of Labor Unions, 30 REG.
"23 (2007).
235. See Beard v. Elster, 160 A.2d 731, 737 (Del. 1960)..
236. See Exacto Spring Corp. v. Comm'r., 196 F.3d 833, 838 (7th Cir. 1999) ("[J]udges
are not competent to decide what business executives are worth").
237. CLARK, supra note 21, §§ 3, 4.
2009]
SMU LAW REVIEW
litigation reflects this judicial reluctance to second guess executive com-
pensation despite significant board dysfunction. 238 In essence, the Disney
cases addressed two decisions by Walt Disney Company's board: (i) the
approval of Michael Ovitz's hiring as president of the company pursuant
to a contract providing generous severance and other terms; and (ii) after
the board had reconstituted, the approval of a "no-fault" termination for
Mr. Ovitz that triggered severance payments in excess of $130 million. 239
The Delaware Supreme Court's opinion in Brehm v. Eisner captures the
tension:
This is potentially a very troubling case on the merits. On the one
hand, it appears from the Complaint that: (a) the compensation and
termination payout for Ovitz were exceedingly lucrative, if not luxu-
rious, compared to Ovitz' value to the Company [that is, a fourteen
month tenure]; and (b) the processes of the boards of directors in
dealing with the approval and termination of the Ovitz Employment
Agreement were casual, if not sloppy and perfunctory. . . . From
what we can ferret out of this deficient pleading, the processes of the
Old Board and the New Board were hardly paradigms of good cor-
porate governance practices. Moreover, the sheer size of the payout
to Ovitz, as alleged, pushes the envelope of judicial respect for the
business judgment of directors in making compensation decisions.240
Ultimately, the Disney litigation did not result in liability for Disney's
directors, who approved Ovitz's compensation. 241 Nonetheless, the deci-
sion sent a warning signal to corporate boardrooms.242 The subsequent
Chancery Court opinion noted that the conduct of the Disney directors
238. See generally In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006);
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000); In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.,
907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005); In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275
(Del. Ch. 2003); In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342 (Del. Ch. 1998).
But see In re Viacom Inc. S'holder Derivative Litig., No. 60527/05, 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS
2891, at *22 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 23, 2006) (finding that the plaintiff raised sufficient ques-
tions about the independence of the compensation committee to avoid dismissal under the
business judgment rule). The lack of director independence may give rise to entire fairness
review. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 809-11 (Del. 1984). Robert Clark describes
the business judgment rule as follows:
The rule is simply that the business judgment of the directors will not be
challenged or overturned by courts or shareholders, and the directors will not
be held liable for the consequences of their exercise of business judgment-
even for judgments that appear to have been clear mistakes-unless certain
exceptions apply.
CLARK, supra note 21, § 34; see also FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORA-MON LAW 278-79
(2000) ("The idea underlying the rule is that courts should exercise restraint in holding
directors liable for (or otherwise second guessing) business decisions which produce poor
results or with which reasonable minds might disagree. This seems to be a sensible notion.
After all, business decisions typically involve taking calculated risks.").
239. See In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d at 35.
240. Brehm, 746 A.2d at 249 (Veasey, C.J.) (emphasis added).
241. In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d at 697.
242. See generally Laura M. Holson, Ruling Upholds Disney's Payment in Firing of
Ovitz, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2005, at Al; Bruce Orwall & Merissa Marr, Judge Backs Dis-
ney Directors in Suit on Ovitz's Hiring, Firing, WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 2005, at Al; Editorial,
Regulating Fantasyland, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2005, at A18.
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fell "significantly short of the best practices of ideal corporate govern-
ance," but was nonetheless in good faith. 243 The Chancery Court decision
used sermon-like language to describe the objectionable conduct of Dis-
ney CEO Michael Eisner, asserting that he "enthroned himself as the om-
nipotent and infallible monarch of his personal Magic Kingdom. ' 244 In
essence, the court acknowledged that the board was "stacked" with
friends and acquaintances of Eisner, who "were certainly more willing to
accede to his wishes. '2 45 Despite the reluctance of the Delaware courts
to find liability, Disney arguably established an outer limit of legally per-
missible board conduct with respect to the executive compensation deci-
sion and the public admonishment of the Walt Disney board encouraged
other boards to give executive pay decisions greater attention. However,
the crucial lessons from Disney are relatively clear. As long as directors
observe procedures and act in good faith when relying on independently-
retained experts, director liability remains a remote possibility. 246
2. Procedural Reforms and Mandates to Create Independence
The 1990s witnessed the emergence of the compensation committee
role.247 The increased focus on the compensation committee was driven
in part by executive compensation scandals, IRS executive pay regula-
tions, judicial inquiry, and enhanced disclosure surrounding compensa-
tion committee procedures.248 Today, stock exchanges provide specific
procedural and structural requirements for compensation committees of
listed companies. 249 In general, the listing rules emphasize pay-for-per-
formance and independence.250 Yet procedural requirements mandating
that remuneration committees be composed of non-executive directors
do not necessarily mean diversity of thought on executive pay. Arguably,
non-executive directors, many of whom are former CEOs or other high-
243. In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d at 697.
244. Id. at 763.
245. Id. at 760. For example, the board included an administrator of a school attended
by Eisner's children. Id. at 761 n.488.
246. See id. at 771-72. Richard Grasso's recent exoneration at the hands of the judiciary
signals both the continued reluctance by courts to displace compensation decisions and
business' growing confidence in the courts as opposed to other lawmakers. See People ex
rel. Spitzer v. Grasso, 893 N.E.2d 105, 107-08 (N.Y. 2008) (dismissing four non-statutory
counts against Grasso); People ex rel. Spitzer v. Grasso, 861 N.Y.S.2d 627, 654 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2008) (dismissing two statutory counts against Grasso); Jenny Anderson, Stock Ex-
change's Former Chief Wins Court Battle to Keep Pay, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2008, at Al; see
also Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Court Inc., N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 16, 2008, at 38 (asserting
that there is market bias at the Supreme Court).
247. See Murphy, Politics, supra note 8, at 715.
248. See id. at 737.
249. For example, NYSE listing standards expressly require listed companies to have an
independent compensation committee with a written charter. NYSE, Inc., Listed Com-
pany Manual § 303A.05 (2004) (asserting that committees must "review and approve cor-
porate goals and objectives relevant to CEO compensation, evaluate the CEO's
performance in light of those goals and objectives, and, either as a committee or together
with the other independent directors (as directed by the board), determine and approve
the CEO's compensation level based on this evaluation").
250. See, e.g., id.
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level executives, maintain a similar world view. 251 Moreover, CEOs may
exert power over directors, undermining arms-length bargaining.252
Stock exchange rules are helpful, but not completely effective.253 As Lu-
cien Bebchuk notes: "While procedural requirements may mitigate
problems arising from carelessness and insufficient attention, however,
they do not address those arising from directors' incentives and tenden-
cies to use their discretion in ways that favor executives. ' 254 With the
assistance of consultants and lawyers, directors experience little trouble
providing justifications for their decisions, "sometimes by merely using
boilerplate language. '255
3. Disclosure-Related Reforms
Since 1938, the SEC has promulgated rules on compensation disclosure
to give investors a meaningful impression of executive compensation in
corporate reports, proxy statements, and registration statements.2 56
These rules have emphasized tabular disclosure, narrative disclosure, and
a mixture of the two. 257 Despite these disclosure enhancements, the abil-
ity of corporate directors and executives to circumvent these regulations
and award significant non-performance-based compensation remains. In
1992, SEC disclosure regulations helped make the activities of the com-
pensation committee highly visible to corporate constituencies. 258 The
purpose of these regulations was to give shareholders more meaningful
information concerning the pay of top executives. 259
In 2006, the SEC adopted new regulations prescribing more extensive
requirements for disclosure of executive compensation, related party
transactions, and compensation committee procedures.260 Companies
251. The Pay in Your Boss's Pocket, ECONOMIST, July 30,1994, at 17 ("[N]on-executives
on remuneration committees- are often executive at other companies, and so have an
incentive to bid up the going rate for the job.").
252. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 49, at 4-5. The CEO may ultimately play a
significant role in board remuneration. Id.
253. Id. at 4.
254. Id. at 195.
255. Id.
256. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 229.10 (2008); 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2007).
257. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(k).
258. Martin, supra note 48, at 148 & n.10 (citing 17 C.F.R. §§ 228, 229, 240, 249 (1992));
see also 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(k) (1992).
259. Martin, supra note 48, at 148-49. The 1992 regulations generated more comment
than any subject in SEC history up until that time. Id. at 149. A significant amount of
criticism came from business leaders who initially raised competition concerns. Id. at 148-
49.
260. Jeremy Grant, SEC Rule Puts Top Salaries Under Scrutiny, FIN. TIMES (London),
July 27, 2006, at 24 ("Disclosure of executive pay and perks in America received their
biggest overhaul in 14 years yesterday when the Securities and Exchange Commission ap-
proved a new set of rules designed to help investors better understand how top company
officers are rewarded."); see Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, Se-
curities Act Release No. 8732, Exchange Act Release No. 54,302, Investment Company
Act Release No. 27,444, 71 Fed. Reg. 53,158 (Sept. 8, 2006); see also Christopher Cox,
Chairman Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Opening Statement at an SEC Meeting: Proposed Revi-
sions to the Executive Compensation and Related Party Disclosure Rules (Jan. 17, 2006),
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch011706cc.htm.
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must disclose compensation for their top five executives in their annual
disclosure documents and include a detailed compensation discussion and
analysis (CD&A). 26 1 The CD&A is management's disclosure, rather
than the compensation committee's. 262 The purpose behind the CD&A
is to discourage boilerplate disclosures that fail to provide meaningful
company specific information.2 63 The CD&A explains in detail the infor-
mation contained in the compensation tables. But, even with the existing
disclosure requirements, significant elements of pay, such as non-contrac-
tual severance payments and charitable contributions, remain
excluded.2 64
Without question, enhanced disclosure requirements act as a constraint
on managers and improve the monitoring capabilities of corporate con-
stituents.265 But, if past history is any indication of future performance,
disclosure rules cannot fully curb abuses or pay levels. In certain in-
stances, enhanced disclosure may actually lead to higher pay levels,266
and it can give rise to more opaque forms of compensation.267 Although
effective, disclosure presents a "double-edged sword," as David Walker
explains:
[E]nhanced disclosure is a double-edged sword. Increased disclosure
requirements concerning compensation element A may lead execu-
tives to favor a less efficient, but more opaque, compensation ele-
ment B. Thus, in order for mandatory disclosure to increase
shareholder value, disclosure practice must stay tightly attuned to
compensation practice, effectively preventing executives from cir-
cumventing the requirements. In addition, enhanced disclosure may
lead to executive compensation ratcheting upwards as firms bench-
mark compensation against each other.268
261. See id. § 229.402(a), (b) (2007). SEC proxy statement disclosure regulations are
found in Regulation S-K Items 402 and 407, 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.402, 229.407 (2006).
262. The compensation committee, however, is required to include a Compensation
Committee Report in the corporation's annual disclosure documents. 17 C.F.R.
§ 229.407(e).
263. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(b). In addition to explaining tabular information, the
CD&A provides answers to the following questions: (i) What are the objectives of the
company's compensation programs?; (ii) What is the compensation program designed to
reward and not reward?; (iii) What is each element of compensation?; (iv) Why does the
company choose to pay each element?; (v) How does the company determine the amount
for each element?; and (vi) How does each element fit into the company's overall compen-
sation objective? Id. § 229.402(b)(1).
264. See Walker, supra note 46, at 657-58 (footnotes omitted).
265. See Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE
IT 92 (1914) ("Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient
policeman.").
266. Randall S. Thomas, Explaining the International CEO Pay Gap: Board Capture or
Market Driven?, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1171, 1264 (2004) (suggesting that enhanced disclosure
may ratchet up pay).
267. See Walker, supra note 46, at 656-57 ("Managers have an interest in concealing
compensation and will respond to new disclosure requirements by inventing new, opaque
compensation elements. Thus, adequate disclosure will be a continuing race between regu-
lators, on the one hand, and corporate executives and their compensation consultants, on
the other."); see also Martin, supra note 48, at 153.
268. Walker, supra note 46, at 658.
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To be fair, the quality of disclosures regarding equity compensation, the
metrics used, and greater transparency concerning perquisites have im-
proved over time in conjunction with financial statement treatment of eq-
uity compensation. 269 These enhancements move toward providing
corporate constituents a bottom-line snap shot of executive compensa-
tion. An additional benefit of disclosure is that it may also lead compa-
nies to revisit compensation practices, not to simply comply with
regulations but also to avoid public embarrassment.
4. Reforms Targeting Shareholder Input and Voting
a. Approval of Equity Compensation Plans
In 2003, the SEC approved new self-regulatory organization (SRO)
rules mandating shareholder approval of equity compensation plans.270
The NYSE and NASDAQ shareholder approval requirements for equity
compensation plans require shareholder approval for equity compensa-
tion plans and for the material alteration of such plans subject to certain
exceptions. 271 Approval of a plan, however, is not synonymous with ap-
provals of grants to specific individuals under a plan. Shareholders may
lobby their dissatisfaction with equity compensation plans, but they have
little control over executive pay. Such plans are often broadly worded to
leave the board significant discretion.272 A broadly worded plan, once
approved by shareholders, allows directors to make changes, year after
year, without triggering an additional shareholder voting requirement. 273
Moreover, shareholders do not approve the specific number of options
given to a particular executive. 274 Therefore, these requirements alone
cannot ensure that equity-based compensation serves shareholder inter-
ests.275 Even with veto power over equity compensation plans, the exer-
cise of such power still provides broad discretion for directors to award
large bonuses with tenuous links to performance. On balance, SRO ap-
proval requirements "merely expand an already common practice that
has not proven to be an effective constraint on boards. '276
b. "Say-on-Pay"
In an attempt to create greater shareholder input on the specific issue
of executive compensation, a number of legislators have proposed "say-
269. See RiskMetrics Group, supra note 42, at 20-21.
270. See Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 48,108, 68 Fed.
Reg. 39,995 (June 30, 2003).
271. See NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 303A.08 (2004); NASD Rule
4350(i)(1)(A) (2004).
272. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 49, at 196.
273. 2 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: LAW AND PRACTICE § 16.03 (Bart Schwartz & Amy
L. Goodman eds., 2004).
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on-pay" legislation.2 77 On March 1, 2007, Massachusetts Congressman
Barney Frank introduced House Bill 1257, "The Shareholder Vote on
Compensation Act. '278 This legislation requires public companies to pro-
vide detailed executive compensation plans for shareholder approval at
each annual meeting of shareholders, and it also requires separate share-
holder approval for executive compensation related to a merger, acquisi-
tion, or disposition.279 The House of Representatives approved this bill
with a vote of 269 to 134, and the bill was referred to the Senate in accor-
dance with legislative procedures.280 On April 20, 2007, Senator Barack
Obama introduced the "Shareholder Vote on Executive Compensation
Act" in the U.S. Senate.281 This bill is virtually identical to the bill that
Congressman Barney Frank introduced in the House of Represen-
tatives. 282
The above-mentioned say-on-pay proposals are advisory and non-bind-
ing.283 Thus, shareholders can articulate dissatisfaction, but cannot veto
pay packages. Say-on-pay measures may have a modest impact, but will
not "prevent headline-grabbing paydays" nor "further political outrage,
and more red-faced bosses coming under fire."'2 84 Without the actual
ability to veto pay packages, is there any value to say-on-pay measures?
Certainly. Say-on-pay votes, although advisory, provide a warning signal
to wayward management, who may rethink future actions to avoid being
voted out.285 The adoption of advisory say-on-pay measures may also
provide a benefit to management by ameliorating shareholder and non-
shareholder constituency outrage by signaling democratic virtues with
which corporate constituencies may identify. In other words, even if ad-
visory say-on-pay measures are merely symbolic, they may have a tangi-
ble impact on shareholder satisfaction and director discretion.2 86
However, the hidden costs of these mandatory one-size-fits-all proposals
are unknown.287
277. See Jeremy Grant, SEC Chief Looks to Europe on Rights for Shareholders, FIN.
TIMES (London), Feb. 23, 2007, at 15 ("The issue of whether-and how-to allow share-
holders in US companies greater say in choosing board directors and setting executive pay
is moving centre stage as the proxy voting season gets under way.").
278. See H.R. REP. No. 110-88 (2007) (discussing legislative history of H.R. 1257).
279. See Shareholder Vote on Executive Compensation Act, H.R. 1257, 110th Cong.,
§ 2 (2007) (as passed by House, April 20, 2007).
280. Id.
281. See Shareholder Vote on Executive Compensation Act, S. 1181, 110th Cong.
(2007).
282. Compare id., with H.R. 1257.
283. H.R. 1257; S. 1181.
284. Pay Attention, supra note 209.
285. See Fair or Foul?, ECONOMIST, June 14, 2008, at 78.
286. While executive pay is also an important socio-political issue in Europe, the Euro-
pean executive earns forty percent of what an American executive earns. See Pay Atten-
tion, supra note 215. The global market for executive talent has led to an increase in
executive pay among European firms, yet shareholders harbor less dissatisfaction with Eu-
ropean firms due in part to the shareholders' ability to vote on compensation packages.
See id. Such votes are most often non-binding or advisory as opposed to binding. Id.
287. See Rosen, supra note 171, at 2932.
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In addition to legislation, shareholders, via shareholder resolutions,
have attempted to amend corporate by-laws to provide for advisory votes
on executive pay.288 RiskMetrics predicts nearly "70 'say on pay' resolu-
tions will be tabled in 2008 . . . , up from 52 in 2007."289 While some
companies have adopted such resolutions, the majority of companies still
have not.290
5. Tax-related Reforms
The Internal Revenue Code (IRC) and tax-related regulations have
often been used to influence executive compensation. These tax-related
reforms targeting executive pay have been the subject of significant con-
troversy and criticism. Congress enacted tax laws to stem perceived
abuses of executive compensation in two primary areas: (i) the level of
compensation; and (ii) change-in-control agreements.
a. Tax Deductibility Limits on Non-Performance-Based Pay
In 1993, Congress passed legislation with the express purpose of con-
taining the level of executive compensation in response to widespread
public "scrutiny. '' 291 Despite these intentions, the legacy of Section
162(m) has more to do with escalation of pay than its limitation. Section
162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code limits tax deductions for executive
pay over $1 million; however, there is an important exception for quali-
fied performance-based compensation for which companies are allowed
to receive deductibility. 292 Despite the deductibility cap under 162(m),
most large public companies continue to pay CEOs and senior executives
total compensation in excess of $1 million and have little difficulty claim-
ing tax deductibility for compensation well in excess of $1 million.293 In
essence, 162(m) stipulates that as long as pay is loosely tied to perform-
ance metrics and certain procedural requirements are met (for example,
independent compensation committee), companies can escape the de-
ductibility cap.294 As a consequence of 162(m), there was a seismic shift
from fixed base pay to the award of share options based upon perform-
ance.295 The stated goals of 162(m) are unrealized, as executive compen-
sation has risen to all-time highs.296 The failure of 162(m) rests on a
faulty premise that performance-based compensation incentives will re-
288. Fair or Foul, supra note 285.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Revenues Report to Accompany Recommendations from the Committee on Ways
and Means, H.R. REP. No. 103-111, at 646 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 378, 877.
292. Miske, supra note 10, at 1684.
293. Id. at 1687.
294. Id. at 1691-92.
295. Id. at 1688.
296. Id. at 1684 (asserting that the use of tax caps led to the unintended consequences
of increased levels of pay-for-performance because the caps functioned as a minimum base
salary rather than the maximum); see also Knutt, supra note 13, at 495 (arguing that tax
and disclosure reforms aimed at executive compensation are ineffective).
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duce overall pay.297 But another plausible outcome is for such incentives
to ratchet-up overall pay.
b. Change-in-control Golden Parachute Limitations
In addition to 162(m), "golden parachute" tax laws under the IRC seek
to limit excessive parachute payments in the event of a change of con-
trol.298 These provisions impose a twenty percent tax penalty on "exces-
sive parachute payments. '299 Not unexpectedly, there are multiple
exceptions that limit the regulation's effectiveness. For example, compa-
nies can avoid the regulation by showing that pay reflects (i) personal
services to be offered on or after the date of change in control or (ii)
services already rendered before such date. 300 These golden parachute
tax measures, however, led to another unintended consequence known as
the excise tax gross-up.301 A gross-up operates when companies make an
agreement that, in the event an executive becomes liable for excise taxes
under the golden parachute provisions, the company will compensate the
executive for any resulting taxes.302 According to one study, excise tax
gross-ups can cost companies over three dollars for every dollar of tax
paid, operating as a hidden merger cost.30 3
6. Clawback Provisions: Sarbanes Oxley Act Section 304 Forfeiture of
Bonuses
Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) requires the
CEO and CFO of a firm required to restate earnings due to material non-
compliance of financial reporting requirements under the securities laws
to repay to their company any bonus or other incentive or equity-based
compensation received during the 12 months following the filing of the
misleading financial statement, or any profits realized from the sale of
stock within that 12-month period, if the restatement results from miscon-
duct.30 4 The statute, however, does not specify what degree of miscon-
duct or whose misconduct is necessary to trigger the regulation. In the
first six years following passage of Section 304, there have been
297. See Miske, supra note 10, at 1687.
298. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 280G, 4999 (2000).
299. 26 U.S.C. § 4999(a).
300. See id. § 280(G)(b)(4). The golden parachute regulations also provide guidance
for how options are to be valued pursuant to a change in control. The methodology loosely
tracks the Black-Scholes model formula for valuing options. See RiskMetrics Group, supra
note 42, at 31-33. Even under-water options are ascribed some value for purposes of the
golden parachute tax rules.
301. Miske, supra note 10, at 1681.
302. Id.
303. See RiskMetrics Group, supra note 42, at 31 (citing Randy Myers, Minimize Para-
chute Penalties, 192 J. Accr. 33 (2001)).
304. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 49, at 185 (citing Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub.
L. No. 107-204, § 304, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18,
28 and 29 O.S.C.)).
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clawbacks in only a small number of cases. 30 5
All of these cases involved a corporate officer who personally commit-
ted fraud and misconduct.306 Although the statute does not expressly re-
quire the officer from whom the clawback is sought to personally engage
in misconduct, the statute has been construed narrowly. The ultimate im-
pact of the SOX clawback provisions hinges on their enforcement. 30 7
V. THE DEMAND SIDE: CORPORATE CONSTITUENCIES
AS CUSTOMERS
The demand side of the corporate reform market involves several cate-
gories of customers who have (i) asymmetric power to extract gains from
the regulatory process, (ii) varied abilities to detect regulation quality,
and (iii) different incentives to acquire information about public pol-
icy. 30 8 Within this context, the interests of managers and large sharehold-
ers prevail over diffuse corporate constituents such as small individual
shareholders and populist groups. Corporate managers and institutional
shareholders have a large enough stake in regulatory outcomes to over-
come rational ignorance or apathy over business policies. Alternatively,
other corporate constituents, such as small individual shareholders and
non-shareholder populist constituencies, have weaker incentives to
gather and acquire information regarding both favorable and unfavorable
business policies.
A. CORPORATE MANAGERS
The corporate firm is arguably the chief consumer of executive com-
pensation regulation. The corporate firm, however, is an aggregation of
discrete interest groups that should be subdivided. Corporate managers
(for example, directors, CEO, CFO, etc.) who steer and monitor the firm
are a key constituency. In theory, the board of directors has the ultimate
responsibility to manage and monitor the firm, but, in reality, the CEO
implements and most likely creates strategy. The board, often via com-
mittees, hires the CEO and sets their compensation. 30 9 Corporate man-
agers have significant operational expertise and informational advantages
when compared to other corporate constituents. Moreover, corporate
managers are more likely to interact with lawmakers via lobbying, gov-
305. See generally Rachael E. Schwartz, The Clawback Provision of Sarbanes-Oxley:
An Underutilized Incentive to Keep the Corporate House Clean, 64 Bus. LAw. 2 (2008).
306. Id.
307. Section 402 also places restrictions, subject to limited exceptions, on personal loans
to directors and executive officers of listed companies. See Securities Exchange Act of
1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, §13(k), 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(k)
(Supp. 2002)); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 402, 116 Stat. 745, 747
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78M(k) (Supp. IV 2004)).
308. See Peltzman, supra note 31, at 823 (discussing rational ignorance among consum-
ers); Peltz*man, supra note 7, at 240; Stigler, supra note 123, at 8-9.
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ernment procurement, and other forms of government interaction. 310 In
carrying out their duties, "[d]irectors and officers simply assume or state
that the main effort is to maximize shareholder value, and that other
groups must be kept happy enough to achieve this goal."'3 11
B. SHAREHOLDERS
The shareholder is often touted as the underpinning of corporate gov-
ernance. There is considerable debate concerning the optimal degree of
shareholder influence on firm decision-making and whether shareholder
wealth maximization is the optimal measure of corporate performance.3 12
In theory, shareholders, if dissatisfied with management, can either vote
directors out or sell their shares. 313 In reality, shareholders' ability to
vote out directors is constrained, and even shareholders with large stakes
in a company may be reluctant to sell their stake.31 4 The modern share-
holder is not a monolithic concept and can be divided into various sub-
groups. 315 For example, the comparison of "institutional shareholders"
to "individual shareholders" illustrates varied degrees of information
asymmetries, business acumen, investor time horizons, and apathy.31 6
1. Individual Shareholders
Generally, individual shareholders are too numerous, diffuse, and apa-
thetic to individually participate in monitoring the firm. The billionaire
investor Carl Icahn is an exception.31 7 The impact of individual share-
holders is perhaps overstated when one considers that most U.S. citizens
hold company shares indirectly via mutual funds. 318 Given information
asymmetries, individual shareholders have limited incentives and capacity
to discern the quality of legal reforms.
310. See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 178, at 1504-07.
311. Robert C. Clark, Major Changes Lead Us Back to Basics (A Response to the Sym-
posium on My Treatise), 31 J. CORP. L. 591, 596 (2006).
312. See Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder
Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 646-47 (2006) (acknowledging that certain stakeholder inter-
ests are not reflected in measures of shareholder wealth and questioning the suitability of
shareholder wealth as a unitary basis for corporate regulatory decisions).
313. See Jason M. Loring & C. Keith Taylor, Shareholder Activism: Directorial Re-
sponses to Investors' Attempts to Change the Corporate Governance Landscape, 41 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 321, 324 (2006).
314. See id. (asserting that an institutional investor might not be able to pull out, or
"vot[e] with its feet," for fear of causing market repercussions of major shifts in large
portfolios).
315. Id. at 323.
316. See id. at 323-25 (analyzing support for shareholder proposals for both individual
and institutional investors).
317. See Shawn Tully, The Hottest Investor in America, FORTUNE, May 30, 2007, availa-
ble at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortunearchive/2007/06/11/100060832/in-
dex.htm?postversion=2007053010 (describing Carl Icahn's shareholder activism and his
impact on the reduction of a particular CEO's bonus); cf. Langevoort, supra note 113, at
1835-36 ("To be sure, successful exercise of investor power has been uneven and epi-
sodic-many institutional investors remain conflicted and unwilling to oppose manage-
ment, so that activists rarely expect an easy majority of votes.").




On the other hand, institutional shareholders (for example, mutual
funds and pension funds) have greater capacity to monitor firms and par-
ticipate in firm governance. 31.9 Yet such capacity does not necessarily
transform into action. The primary concern for most institutional inves-
tors is promoting shareholder wealth maximization via controlling mana-
gerial costs. 32 0 This leaves institutional investors moderately conservative
and indifferent to a range of reforms that do not directly implicate share-
holder wealth maximization. Nonetheless, there is some evidence sug-
gesting that institutional investors play a more activist monitoring role. 32 1
For example, public pension funds and labor-managed funds break the
mold of ambivalence and are more activist and "attentive to constituen-
cies whose interests diverge from share price maximization. ''322 This sub-
set of institutional investors often places greater emphasis on security and
moderate risk-qualities that employees, retirement savers, and the gen-
eral public may find appealing. 323 These funds often voice concerns over
executive pay levels and are more likely to blur the line between public
accountability and shareholder wealth maximization. 324 Some commen-
tators argue that managers of pension funds are, in essence, bureaucrats
with limited incentives to push for more efficient compensation
relationships. 325
C. POPULIST GROUPS
Populist groups form another major customer segment for executive
compensation reform. Populist groups include broader stakeholder
groups, such as employees, unions, environmental and consumer watch-
dogs, and communities. These groups often define executive compensa-
tion differently than managers and look beyond shareholder-wealth
maximization;326 yet, their connection to firm decision-making is more
tenuous, and their claims of corporate accountability have strong political
319. Id. at 323 ("The institutional investor, because of its fiscal impact on a company,
generally wields more power than does an individual investor. This power also has an
impact on voting because institutional investors are occasionally 'able to put enough pres-
sure on management to convince the company to implement the proposal without going
through with a vote."' (quoting Marc H. Follardori, Shareholder Proposals, in 3 PREPARA-
TION OF ANNUAL DISCLOSURE DOCUMENTS 2004, at 25, 91 (Klaus Eppler et al. eds.,
2004))).
320. Langevoort, supra note 113, at 1836.
321. See Jennifer Levitz, Do Mutual Funds Back CEO Pay?, WALL ST. J., Mar. 28, 2006,
at C1 (discussing a study showing institutional shareholder support for executive pay plans
and opposition to other shareholder proposals on executive compensation). Even if share-
holder involvement was the norm, certain governance concerns remain: (i) short-termism;
(ii) pursuit of social agendas; and (iii) lack of management expertise. These criticisms are
most likely to apply to individual investors.
322. Langevoort, supra note 113, at 1836.
323. See id. at 1836-37.
324. See id.
325. See, e.g., Murphy, Politics, supra note 8, at 726.
326. Id. at 715.
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and fairness-related undertones. 32 7 Populist attacks on wealth discrepan-
cies are understandable in light of the declining significance of unions,
global labor competition, and economic turmoil, especially where CEOs
are perceived as benefiting from the turmoil. 328
D. ADDRESSING RISKS: How CAN CORPORATE CONSTITUENTS
IDENTIFY THE QUALITY OF REGULATION GIVEN
INFORMATION CONSTRAINTS?
In most of the literature regarding credence services, the government is
treated as a potential third-party monitor or information-gatherer to ad-
dress market failure. This Article takes a different vantage point and
casts lawmakers as suppliers of regulatory reform services who share sim-
ilar conflicts and constraints as private evaluators. 32 9 The credence quali-
ties of corporate reform are costly to evaluate and, as a result, some
external monitoring or information-gathering function becomes ex-
tremely valuable. 330 Given informational constraints, corporate constitu-
ents rely on various quality proxies as a risk reduction strategy. These
corporate constituent decision-making heuristics include, but are not lim-
ited to: (i) third parties and reputational intermediaries; (ii) lawmaker
credible commitment and brand equity; and (iii) legitimizing procedures.
1. Third Parties and Reputational Intermediaries
Due to the credence characteristics of executive compensation reform,
corporate constituencies rely on third-party input to make quality deter-
minations. In this sense, corporate constituencies seek input like a pa-
tient seeking a second opinion. Although imperfect, third-party
perspectives are undoubtedly a useful decision-making heuristic for cor-
porate constituencies.
a. Institutional Shareholders
Institutional shareholders may have the resources and information to
limit the amount of manipulation by lawmakers and executives. Institu-
tional shareholders may provide information to more diffuse and ration-
ally apathetic shareholders (as well as shareholders who lack the financial
capacity to gather information and monitor corporate activity). Institu-
tional shareholders may also develop their own best practice guidelines to
supplement what the existing regulatory regime and the market ignore.
Institutional shareholders, particularly groups of them who vote accord-
ing to such best practice guidelines, undoubtedly catch the attention of
senior management. There are notable examples of increased activism by
institutional shareholders in response to executive compensation. For ex-
ample, a coalition of pension funds withheld votes from ten of Home De-
327. See id. at 717.
328. Id.
329. See Darby & Karni, supra note 25, at 87.
330. Id. at 86.
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pot's eleven directors for their failure to link pay to performance. 331
Coupled with the impact of proxy advisory services, such as Institutional
Shareholder Services (ISS), institutional shareholders have even greater
potential to influence pay practices. In this sense, institutional sharehold-
ers can occupy a quasi-diagnostic role for smaller shareholders and, in the
case of pension funds, populist constituencies like employees.
b. Compensation Consultants and Executive Search Firms
i. Compensation Consultants
Generally, compensation consultants provide advice and support to
boards or board committees that are ultimately responsible for executive
compensation decisions. On certain engagements, compensation consul-
tants may not offer advice, but simply analyze data.332 The use of com-
pensation consultants by committees has received a significant degree of
criticism and concern from academics and regulators alike.333 Specifi-
cally, consultant over-reliance on surveys with skewed methodology has
received criticism for ratcheting up executive pay.334 The "Lake
Wobegon effect" is well documented, and no strong candidate desires pay
at or below the mean in their peer group.335 Almost everyone, including
CEOs and directors, believes he or she is above average. A key problem
with over-reliance on survey data is that consultants may select an inap-
propriate peer group as a benchmark. 336 The Richard Grasso pay scandal
was an outgrowth of this problem.337 The average peer company used to
benchmark Grasso's pay had a median revenue of $26 billion, twenty-five
times that of the NYSE, median assets 125 times higher, and a median
331. See Press Release, Am. Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees, AFSCME
Seeks to Hold Home Depot Board Accountable for Excessive Executive Pay (May 22,
2006), http://www.afscme.org/press/6661.cfm.
332. See Executive Pay: The Role of Compensation Consultants, Hearing Before the H.
Comm. On Oversight and Government Reform, 110th Cong. (2007) (testimony of Donald
L. Lowman, Managing Director, Towers, Perrin, Forster & Crosby, Inc.) [hereinafter Low-
man Testimony], available at http://ovresight.house.gov/documents/20071205125920.pdf.
333. See id.; Stabile, supra note 217, at 132 (asserting that compensation consultants are
influenced by who hire them now but also in the future).
334. See NAT'L ASS'N OF CORP. DIRS., REPORT OF THE NACD BLUE RIBBON COMMIS-
SION ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND THE ROLE OF THE COMPENSATION COMMIITEE
13 (2003) ("The tendency of some compensation committees to pay at the 75th percentile
has led to upward ratcheting of pay that is not always justified by individual or company
performance, and that does not always consider the company's financial circumstances.").
335. See FRANK & COOK, supra note 38, at 104-05 ("The phenomenon has most often
been explained in motivational terms by authors who note that the observed biases are
psychologically gratifying. Thus, since it is unpleasant to think of oneself as below average,
a cheap solution is simply to think of oneself as above average."); Martin, supra note 48, at
163 ("Graef Crystal, a well-known compensation consultant, has found after studying hun-
dreds of companies, almost no relationship between CEO pay and profits, but rather be-
tween an individual CEO and other CEOs: a third of companies want their CEO's pay
package to be in the top 25% and no company wants to pay their CEO below the industry
average.").
336. See Gretchen Morgenson, Peer Pressure: Inflating Executive Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
26, 2006, available at http://www.hytimes.com/2006/11/26/business/yourmoney/26peer.html.
337. Id.
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number of employees thirty times greater.338 To be fair, this is an ex-
treme example, and most consultants rely on factors other than
surveys. 339 In the words of a prominent compensation consultant,
"[s]urvey data should inform, but not determine, pay levels" and "should
be used judiciously, in conjunction with a host of other factors. '340
Compensation consultants have also come under fire for potential con-
flicts of interest when a consulting firm simultaneously provides executive
compensation consulting and other consulting services to a single corpo-
rate client.341 Some critics assert that a rule barring multiple arrange-
ments would resolve the conflicts.342 There are, however, credible
contrary arguments. Larger firms with numerous clients arguably are not
as beholden to a single company for their revenues, whereas smaller firms
that specialize may be less objective due to additional financial pres-
sures.343 Therefore,
far from presenting an obvious or attractive solution to the perceived
problem of conflict of interest in the delivery of executive compensa-
tion consulting services, a rule barring firms from accepting both ex-
ecutive compensation and other types of consulting engagements
from the same company actually could exacerbate the risk that a
company could receive conflict-compromised advice.344
Despite the emphasis on compensation consultants, one cannot underes-
timate how improved disclosures by large companies have also placed
significant upward pressure on pay.
ii. Executive Search Firms
The role of executive search firms is often understated in the executive
compensation literature. Top executive search firms have firsthand in-
sight into the executive talent market and search criteria for both CEOs
and directors. 345 Thus, board members may look to executive search
firms for guidance concerning CEO candidates and compensation. 346
Specifically, search firms may "provide input on a candidate's desired
compensation and assist the client in formulating an offer, presenting [the
offer] to the candidate, and negotiating [the offer's] acceptance. '347
Moreover, "[sihould extensive, complex negotiations be required, the cli-
ent and search firm may choose to tap an external compensation consult-
ant until an agreement is reached. ' 348 Search firms also provide CEO
succession planning that may lower search costs, identify strong internal
338. See id.
339. See Lowman Testimony, supra note 332, at 11-12.
340. Id..
341. See id. at 1-6.
342. See id. at 5-6.
343. Id. at 6.
344. Id.
345. See Heidrick & Struggles, supra note 309, at 9.
346. Id.




candidates, and prevent firms from overpaying a mediocre CEO candi-
date in periods of crisis.349 The search firm mandate differs from the
compensation consultant mandate. For the search firm, securing top
CEO talent is the primary objective while compensation is a secondary
concern. 350 The market for top executives is extremely competitive, re-
sembling free-agency in professional sports.351 Companies are likely to
pay even more to secure external CEO candidates during periods of eco-
nomic turmoil because candidates are reluctant to move and desire
greater compensation in exchange for additional risk associated with
changing positions. 352
c. Institutional Investor Advisory Services
Institutional investors, despite having greater capacity to monitor and
gather information, may have too small a stake in a company or too lim-
ited industry expertise to monitor it actively. Thus, consultancies play a
prominent role by advising institutional investors. RiskMetrics Group,
formerly ISS, advises institutional investors on how to vote at annual
meetings and provides company-specific ratings to the investor
community.353
i. Proxy Advisory Services
Proxy advisory service organizations (especially ISS, boasting over 300
institutional and corporate clients worldwide) are a growing force in cor-
porate governance. 354 ISS notably incorporates pay-for-performance
methodology into its advisory services. 355 For example, where a discon-
nect exists between CEO performance and pay and ISS guidelines, ISS is
likely to recommend a vote against an equity compensation plan.356
ii. Corporate Governance Ratings
The Corporate Governance Quotient (CGQ) is a "rating system ...
designed in collaboration with a panel of industry and academic experts,
349. See Heidrick & Struggles, supra note 37, at 2-3.
350. See id. at 3. However, one cannot rule out the potential influence of search firm
compensation that might include one-third of the sum of an executive's first year base
salary plus bonus.
351. See FRANK & COOK, supra note 38, at 71 (asserting that the market for top execu-
tive talent resembles free agency in professional sports and escalates compensation).
352. See id.
353. See generally RiskMetrics Group, Company History, http://www.riskmetrics.com/
history (last visited Nov. 9, 2008).
354. Id. ISS was acquired by RiskMetrics Group in 2007. Id.
355. RiskMetrics Group, 2007 Compensation FAQs, http://www.riskmetrics.com/about/
policy/2007_compensationFAQ (last visited Nov. 9, 2008).
356. In 2004, ISS incorporated pay-for-performance factors into "its proprietary quanti-
tative model for determining whether to ... vote for or against proposed equity compensa-
tion plans." 2 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 273, § 16.05.
"If the potential cost (including both shareholder value transfer and voting power dilution)
of the proposed plan, when combined with existing plans, exceeds the cap or ... violates
ISS repricing guidelines (expressly allowing repricing of underwater stock options without
shareholder approval), ISS [generally] recommends a vote against ... the proposed plan."
Id.
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in order to assist institutional investors in evaluating the quality of corpo-
rate boards and the impact their governance practices may have on per-
formance. ' 357 The CGQ relies on sixty-five criteria, and at least ten of
these criteria relate directly or indirectly to executive compensation. 358
d. Academics
Academics have a tangible and useful role to play in corporate govern-
ance by raising difficult questions for lawmakers and educating corporate
constituencies. Congressional testimony, op-ed pieces in the mainstream
press, books, and articles by legal scholars are all potential sources of
academic impact. 359 In certain circumstances, this may require an ap-
praisal about the limits of legal measures as well as the need for enhance-
ments. But the perspective must recognize the contextual environment
(for example, political and economic) within which companies operate. 360
Academic influence may also hinge on the ability of academics to per-
suade lawmakers or to educate powerful corporate constituencies like in-
stitutional shareholders.
e. Activist Organizations and Corporate Watchdogs
Non-shareholder activists and corporate watchdogs can be a significant
source of information for corporate constituents in need of information
to discern the quality of the reform and the lawmaker's commitment to
their concerns. 361 Activist and watchdog organizations arguably improve
corporate constituent utility via information gathering. Absent the need
for activist endorsement or acquiescence, lawmakers may have little in-
centive to provide services addressing populist concerns. 362 The AFL-
CIO and Public Citizen are examples of activist organizations. 363 Activist
organizations often "use a variety of tactics-picketing, demonstrations,
357. RiskMetrics Group, Frequently Asked Questions About Corporate Governance
Quotient (CGQ®), http://www.riskmetrics.com/sites/default/files/CGQ%20?FAQ.pdf (last
visited Nov. 9, 2008).
358. See RiskMetrics Group, Summary: CGQ® Ratings Criteria for U.S. Companies,
http://www.riskmetrics.com/sites/default/files/CGQ-Criteria-US.pdf (last visited Nov. 9,
2008). Examples of CGQ criteria include: cost of option plans; whether option re-pricing
is permitted in plan; shareholder approval of option plans; performance-based compensa-
tion; and options backdating. Id.
359. See, e.g., Empowering Shareholders on Executive Compensation: Hearing Before
the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. (2007) (written testimony submitted by Lucian
A. Bebchuk, William J. Friedman, and Alicia Townsend Friedman), available at http://
www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/financialsvcs dem/htbebchuk03O8007.pdf; Lucian
Bebchuk, Op. Ed., Investors Must Have Power, Not Just Figures on Pay, FIN. TIMES
(London), July 27, 2006, at 13 (arguing for greater shareholder power over executive
compensation).
360. As Adolf Berle observed, the modern corporation defies a narrow characterization
and approach to study. Berle, supra note 226, at ix-vx.
361. Feddersen & Gilligan, supra note 7, at 150-51.
362. See id. at 152.
363. See AFL-CIO, About Us, http://www.aflcio.org/aboutus/ (last visited Jan. 20,
2009); Pub. Citizen, http://www.citizen.org/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2009). Although unions
may also hold shares, such interests are minimal.
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boycott calls, or standing before political or administrative agencies and
courts-to attract the media and the public to some moral or political
issue. '364 Yet, activists themselves are constrained by their own self-in-
terest and bias.365 Accordingly, the activist vantage point may also dis-
tort regulatory outcomes.
f. Best Practice Guidelines
In addition to traditional regulators, organizations with an interest in
corporate governance, such as the Business Roundtable; the Blue Ribbon
Commission of the National Association of Directors (NACD); proxy ad-
visory services, such as Institutional Shareholder Services; and institu-
tional investors, like TIAA-CREF, have all published "best practice"
guidelines in an effort to influence the executive compensation debate
and reform.366 Corporate constituents may rely on such guidelines as a
supplement to government regulation because there is a gap between
what laws on the books require and good corporate governance. 367 Best
practice guidelines as advocacy instruments also may influence and edu-
cate lawmakers. In many instances, lawmaker reforms simply mandate
practices that have already been adopted by a significant segment of the
corporate community. 368 Common executive compensation best practice
recommendations include: compensation committee independence and
diligence; training compensation committees; periodic assessments of
compensation committee performance; compensation committee reten-
tion of experts, such as consultants and legal counsel; and board and
shareholder disclosure.369 Examples of more specific best practice rec-
ommendations include: pay-for-performance measures; stock ownership
guidelines; mega-grants of stock options or restricted stock; repricing of
options; performance vesting; holding periods; timing and dating stock
options; and employment and change-in-control contracts. 370
364. Feddersen & Gilligan, supra note 7, at 150-51.
365. See id. at 168-69.
366. See, e.g., ANNALISA BARRETT & PAULA TODD, NAT'L Ass'N OF CORPORATE
DIRS., NACD BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION REPORT ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND
THE ROLE OF THE COMPENSATION COMMITTEE (2003), http://www.directorsforum.org/re-
sources/related-articles/NACDBRCReport.pdf [hereinafter NACD BLUE RIBBON COM-
MISSION REPORT]; TEACHERS INS. & ANNUITY Ass'N OF AM. HUMAN RES. COMM.,
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION POLICY (2008), http://www.tiaa-cref.org/about/governance/
docs/exec-comp-policy.pdf [hereinafter TIAA, EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION POLICY].
367. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light
Reform (And It Might Just Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915, 983 (2003) ("The gap between
what Delaware law requires and what constitutes good corporate governance is enor-
mous."); see also Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 249 (Del. 2000) (distinguishing between
falling short of best practices and legal culpability).
368. Cunningham, supra note 374, at 918.
369. See 2 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 273, § 16.05.
370. See id.; see also COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, BUS. ROUNDTABLE, EXECU-
TIVE COMPENSATION: PRINCIPLES AND COMMENTARY (2007), http://www.businessroundta-
ble.org/sites/default/files/ExecutiveCompensationPrinciples.pdf; CAL. PUB. EMPLOYEES'
RET. SYS., CORE PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUNTABLE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 12, 23-24
(2007), http://www.calpers-governance.org/principles/domestic/us/downloads/us-corpgov-
principles.pdf; COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, THE COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL
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2. Credible Commitment and Brand Equity
Corporate constituencies must combine lawmaker claims of quality and
impact with information about the credibility of such claims.371 The de-
gree of credible commitment among lawmakers varies. Similarly, the
same degree of credible commitment is not available to all corporate con-
stituencies. Credible commitment resembles what Darby and Karni
termed "an informal service contract called the client relationship. '372
The "client relationship is an implicit understanding that the customer
will return for future services so long as he does not detect fraud or low
quality services. '373 In the corporate lawmaker context, credible commit-
ment is an implicit understanding between lawmakers and one or more
constituencies that the lawmaker will continue to respond to their constit-
uent demands. 374 The lawmaker's need for or reliance on political capital
instills confidence among powerful corporate constituencies. 375 There-
fore, knowing the incentives of lawmakers reassures constituents despite
their inability to discern impact. 376 In a more general sense, the Dela-
ware and the federal corporate law regimes respectively resemble brands
upon which corporate constituents make quality assessments. 377
a. Delaware
Delaware's credible commitment to firms is substantial and its brand
equity is strong.378 "Delaware's ability to provide a unique branded cus-
tomer experience explains its dominance and favor among large publicly
traded firms. '379 "Delaware's investment in legal capital (i.e., judicial ex-
INVESTORS CORPORATE GOVERNANCE POLICIES 9-10, 13-18 (2008), http://www.cii.org/pol-
icies (follow "Download the full Council Corporate Governance Policy (PDF)" hyperlink);
GEN. ELEC. Co., THE MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT AND COMPENSATION COMMITTEE
KEY PRACTICES (2008), http://www.ge.com/company/governance/board/mngment dev key
_practices07.pdf; INSTITUTIONAL S'HOLDER SERVS., ISS US CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
POLICY: 2007 UPDATES 17-21 (2006), http://www.riskmetrics.com/sites/default/files/2007_
USPolicy-update.pdf; NACD BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 373; NYSE
Euronext, Listed Company Manual § 303A (2008), http://www.nyse.com/Frameset.html?
nyseref=http%3A//www.nyse.com/regulation/listed/1182508124422.html&displayPage=/
lcm/lcmsection.html (follow "Section 3 Corporate Responsibility" hyperlink; then follow
"303A.00 Corporate Governance Standards" hyperlink; then follow "303A.09 Corporate
Governance Guidelines" hyperlink); TIAA, EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION POLICY, supra
note 373.
371. See Anderson, supra note 94, at 44.
372. Darby & Karni, supra note 25, at 80.
373. Id.
374. Simmons, supra note 159, at 1178-79.
375. See id. at 1187-89.
376. See id. at 1147.
377. See id. at 1150. Credible commitment is an intangible element of a brand. "[T]he
purchase of a branded product as the purchase of two bundled products-a tangible prod-
uct (i.e., physical product) and an intangible product (e.g., psychological associations and
perceptions related to what the Delaware brand represents, which may not relate to tangi-
ble features."). Id. at 1145.
378. See id. at 1139-43, 1178.
379. Id. at 1146; see also Darby & Karni, supra note 25, at 82 ("It is a worthwhile conve-
nience to be able to place greater credit in a salesman's promise that a particular product
has desirable qualities."). With standardization there is a tendency to reflect the status quo
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pertise, case law, a specialized bar, and a business-like Division of Corpo-
rations), and its reliance on franchise taxes [as well as the absence of
pluralistic interest group activity] instills confidence among firms [, espe-
cially managers and shareholders,] that Delaware will continue to re-
spond to their demands. ' 380 Even where Delaware law may not be
optimal for manager or shareholder interests, corporate constituents will
continue to choose Delaware for its credible commitment and brand.
b. The Federal Government
Compared to Delaware, the federal government's credible commit-
ment is weaker and more amorphous. Meanwhile, the federal brand is
less defined and perhaps holds greater sway with certain shareholder and
non-shareholder constituencies. 381 Interest group activity at the federal
level is more pluralistic, and, consequently, the degree of credible com-
mitment from lawmakers to a single constituency is less likely.382 Thus,
the federal government's credible commitment and brand equity among
managers is weaker than Delaware's. In theory, the federal government
should be more sensitive to non-shareholder sentiment. This added sensi-
tivity, however, does not necessarily translate into tangible stakeholder-
leaning reforms. Ironically, there is both corporate manager and non-
shareholder skepticism concerning federal corporate reform.383 The fed-
eral brand of corporate law, particularly the SEC, has suffered a serious
blow in the wake of the financial market collapse and the exposure of
unprecedented fraud on the investor community.384 Instead of fulfilling
its mandate to protect investors, the SEC is currently perceived as a
"toothless watchdog. ' 385 This lack of faith in the federal government to
effectuate change and provide protection may in part explain why even
non-shareholder constituencies are targeting companies in a more direct
fashion to address social inequity via executive compensation reform in-
stead of simply lobbying the government alone.
38 6
or familiarity. One may choose an item because others recommend it or choose McDon-
ald's over a local family restaurant because of familiarity. See Darby & Karni, supra note
25, at 82.
380. Simmons, supra note 159, at 1178. "Delaware's investment in legal capital signals
to corporations that Delaware will continue to provide experienced and skilled judges and
lawyers to assist corporations." Id. at 1178-79 (defining and discussing the impact of credi-
ble commitment on Delaware's dominance in the corporate charter market); see also Law-
rence A. Hamermesh, The Policy Foundations of Delaware Corporate Law, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 1749, 1760 (2006).
381. See Simmons, supra note 159, at 1165, 1188-89 (comparing Delaware and the fed-
eral government).
382. See id. at 1188.
383. See VOGEL, supra note 184, at 9-10.
384. See Editorial, Stanford Caught Out - At Long Last, FIN. TIMES (USA), Feb. 21,
2009, at 6; Joanna Chung & Andrew Ward, Obama Signals Change with Choice of
Schapiro, FIN. TIMES (USA), Dec. 19, 2008, at 3.
385. See Stanford Caught Out, supra note 384, at 6.
386. See VOGEL, supra note 184, at 226-27.
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3. Procedures as a Default Heuristic for Legitimacy
Procedures are at the heart of the legitimacy of U.S. corporate govern-
ance reforms and the executive compensation debate. Some public
choice theorists contend that "[t]he basic desire to give voters [or constit-
uents] more control of the mechanism is not [necessarily] based on any
false idea of how well the voters are informed. ' 387 Instead, the issue is
"simply that the voters are the only people in the whole process [even if
ignorant] who do not have an element of systematic bias in their decision
process. '388 This approach is too simplistic. From this perspective, even
if the average layperson is misinformed regarding the executive compen-
sation issue, they are still actively pursuing their own perceived well-be-
ing. This perspective further assumes that if a primary goal of lawmakers
is to promote the well-being of citizens, lawmakers should allow greater
say and influence from the common man. This increase in participation
may contribute to greater inefficiency or indeterminacy in regulatory out-
comes, but it is also "likely to make the government more in accord with
the preferences of the common man; i.e. it brings us a little closer to the
objective of popular rule which is supposed to be what democracy is
about. '389 This perspective, however, does not adequately account for
credence characteristics and lawmaker opportunism, and is therefore mis-
placed in the corporate reform context. Participation alone is not suffi-
cient. Informed participation is necessary to hold lawmakers
accountable.
Even assuming there are laws and institutional structures reflecting
democratic accountability, a serious question lingers concerning corpo-
rate constituent information asymmetries. Lawmakers, in their own self
interest, may exploit these information asymmetries without risk of de-
tection. The public's demand for democratic procedures and the seem-
ingly earnest lawmaker response may not solve the issue but could serve
as subterfuge masking the actual problem. Failure to address such infor-
mation asymmetries can have perverse consequences. The executive
compensation issue is a model illustration of this effect. The tenor of
executive pay reform efforts may appear to enhance participation and
promote democratic norms, but such participation may have little impact
on setting a particular executive's pay or realigning the power dynamics
within the firm. Solving executive compensation problems is not simply a
matter of constituent input; rather, it involves constituents, equipped with
sufficient information, making the most of their participation.
Equipped with limited knowledge concerning the impact of a particular
reform, corporate constituencies by default look to procedures as a proxy
for quality. The legitimacy of corporate reforms is often viewed through





a procedural lens as opposed to a substantive one.390 There is simply too
much disagreement concerning the shape of substantive reforms. And
extensive substantive reforms may prove too risky for lawmakers. Not
surprisingly, the majority of executive compensation reforms are
procedural. 391
Multiple constituencies can coalesce around procedures that, irrespec-
tive of their tangible impact, symbolize elements of fairness. Shareholder
voting mechanisms, independent committees, and disclosure require-
ments all reflect democratic procedures that the various corporate con-
stituencies are familiar with in the governmental context. Transplanting
the same democratic features and rhetoric in the corporate context pro-
vides reassurance to corporate constituencies who have asymmetric infor-
mation.392 Democratic procedures are much easier to understand than
markets and the plethora of executive compensation elements and reform
measures that are constantly evolving. Whereas there are procedural
mechanisms to hold governmental power accountable to the general pop-
ulace, such accountability procedures are often absent in the corporate
context, especially beyond the shareholder constituency. As the past two
decades of executive compensation reform reveal, the presence of these
procedural features, despite their reassurance, does not eliminate rising
executive compensation levels or abuses. Nonetheless, democratic proce-
dures, such as shareholder say-on-pay and a contest between corporate
constituents, may signal public legitimacy, but not necessarily investor
legitimacy.393
390. See Cary Coglianese, Legitimacy and Corporate Governance, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L.
159, 161 (2007) (asserting that "corporate governance is akin to procedural legitimacy").
391. Id. at 162.
392. See discussion supra Part IV.D.1.b.
393. See BENZ, supra note 86, at 4. David Vogel describes the value of democratic
procedures:
Indeed, much of the effect of private political pressures on business has
been procedural rather than substantive. One of the most visible of these
procedural changes has been in the composition of some of the corporate
boards of directors. True, the addition of these new members has not re-
sulted in any substantive change in corporate policies, but they are neverthe-
less important symbols of management's recognition of the legitimacy of a
broadened constituency.
VOGEL, supra note 184, at 12. One can marshal a plausible argument that the overempha-
sis on executive pay may shift director focus from more pressing business matters. Vogel
further states: "The most fundamental contribution of citizen pressures has been to link
the corporation more closely with the vitality and turbulence of the democratic process.
Ultimately, cit[i]zen protests have less to do with increasing corporate accountability than
with preserving and strengthening democratic participation." Id. at 227.
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VI. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
A. THE ANALYSIS OF CREDENCE CHARACTERISTICS PROVIDES A
NOVEL ASSESSMENT OF POLITICAL EFFECTS ON EXECUTIVE
COMPENSATION REFORM AND CORPORATE
REFORM IN THE BROADER CONTEXT
The analysis of credence characteristics in the executive compensation
reform context has implications for Wall Street, K Street, and Main
Street. At the political level, executive compensation reforms are inextri-
cably tied to agency costs and public accountability. The credence char-
acteristics analysis requires looking beyond laws on the books and
managerial appropriation to consider lawmaker motivations and corpo-
rate constituent information asymmetries. Just like a reform's impact is
difficult to decipher, lawmaker intent is difficult to discern. This situation
inevitably leaves crude mechanisms upon which corporate constituents
must rely to discern the quality of executive compensation reform. In a
positive sense, these mechanisms have the potential to reduce informa-
tion asymmetries, promote informed participation, constrain lawmaker
discretion, supplement lawmaker expertise, and bolster the legitimacy of
the corporate governance regime. The downside, however, is that such
mechanisms are imprecise and may reflect a particular bias or distortion.
The credence characteristics of executive compensation reform under-
score the important roles that third-party opinions (for example, execu-
tive search firms, compensation consultants, academics, and institutional
investors) and intangible mechanisms (for example, credible commit-
ment, branding, and symbolic procedures) play in U.S. corporate govern-
ance as a check on lawmaker opportunism and, in some cases, lawmaker
incompetence.
Lawmaker incentives are a key underpinning of the credence charac-
teristic analysis. Therefore, it is necessary to make the distinction be-
tween lawmaker opportunism involving the concealment of information
concerning reforms and lawmaker incompetence involving poor informa-
tion quality. In either scenario, the corporate constituent faces similar
risks and costs, but the potential resolution differs. The reduction of
lawmaker opportunism may not necessarily require more government re-
sources, "but only a [lawmaker] decision to stop. ' 3 9 4 The mere threat of
losing political capital may constrain lawmaker opportunism, provided
the decision-making heuristics available to corporate constituents are re-
liable. These mechanisms, however, merely minimize the risk of
lawmaker opportunism rather than eradicate it. Meanwhile, increasing
"the level of [lawmaker] competence or quality of information involves
[the additional] investment of real resources." 39 5 Therefore, combating
lawmaker deficits in expertise requires more than third party mechanisms
exposing lawmaker incompetence. It may also require significant govern-




ment (that is, supply-side) expenditures. As indicated above, the availa-
ble decision-making mechanisms are often imprecise and may suffer from
bias. Although these mechanisms highlight lawmaker opportunism and
incompetence, they may neither adequately discipline lawmakers nor en-
hance government expertise.
The analysis of the credence characteristics of executive compensation
reform is only part of a larger conversation that might sensitize research-
ers to the impact of credence characteristics and political effects on cor-
porate reform in a broader sense. Instead of proffering an in-depth
analysis regarding the substantive merits of existing executive pay re-
forms or a clear vision of the optimal shape of such reforms, the preced-
ing analysis illustrates the impact of political behavior (that is, lawmaker
opportunism) on executive pay reforms. Without accounting for political
impact on the shape of corporate reform, corporate constituents as well
as legal commentators are, in essence, taking a blue pill that may ulti-
mately displace the prospect of optimal reform. Credence characteristics,
in the broader corporate reform context, highlight the need to discipline
lawmaker behavior, enhance lawmaker competence, and address the in-
formational asymmetries of corporate constituents.
B. THE CREDENCE CHARACTERISTICS OF CORPORATE REFORM
ALLOW FOR INCREMENTAL AND MODERATE CHANGE
EVEN IN THE FACE OF CRISIS
Credence characteristics in the executive compensation context pro-
vide lawmakers with greater latitude to maintain political capital without
making significant change. In other words, credence characteristics allow
lawmakers to straddle the fence between political symbolism and consci-
entious resolution.
A number of legal commentators have expressed concern over corpo-
rate lawmakers' "crisis-mode" regulation or "knee-jerk" reform re-
sponses during periods of economic turmoil.396 This concern, although
relevant, is overstated in the executive compensation context. 397 Even
during periods of economic turmoil, corporate lawmakers have consider-
able discretion to respond in a moderate fashion due to the credence
characteristics of corporate reform. Corporate constituents, particularly
those with information asymmetries, usually will not discern the quality
or impact of the reform until after the period of economic crisis has
396. See Romano, supra note 177, at 1528 (explaining SOX's shortcomings as a product
of crisis-mode legislation); see also Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment: A The-
ory of Rhetoric in Corporate Law Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE L.J. 1, 7-8 (2005) (asserting that
the duty of good faith evolved in the "sturm und drang in corporate governance" after the
public scandals of WorldCom, Enron, and Tyco brought into question the current Ameri-
can corporate governance model).
397. Cunningham, supra note 367, at 923-41 (asserting that major scandals at Enron,
WorldCom, Global Crossing, Qwest, and (to an extent) Congressional deference and non-
support for stricter SEC rules during the boom period of the 1990s, led to an environment
where lawmakers felt, at the very least, that they must symbolically undertake some major
legislative action in the business sector).
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passed and constituent outrage wanes, only to reappear again with the
next economic downturn or cycle. Accordingly, corporate lawmakers will
exercise their added discretion to act in a moderate or conservative fash-
ion. Thus, executive compensation reform will continue to evolve incre-
mentally without substantial shifts, despite corporate scandals and
economic turmoil. Massive reforms are too risky. Substantial lawmaker
movements could cause broad constituent backlash, expose ineptitude,
and make lawmakers blameworthy. In fact, many executive compensa-
tion reforms simply formalize best practices already adopted by a signifi-
cant portion of the corporate community. There is always a gap between
what the law requires and what constitutes a well run company. 398 Cor-
porate lawmakers are reluctant to upset the internal power relationships
between shareholders and management, and instead will either: (i) out-
source reform to the vagaries of the market and third-parties; or (ii) regu-
late business activity indirectly or outside of the traditional corporate law
context (for example, tax, antitrust, and labor laws). Best practice codes
are an example of the former alternative. The latter alternative of indi-
rect regulation is more likely to be populist in substance. These situa-
tional factors promote conservatism among corporate lawmakers, who
wish to avoid corporate manager backlash and responsibility for failed
reform efforts.399
C. EXECUTIVE PAY REFORM OPERATES AS A BLUE PILL-
A MECHANISM FOR LAWMAKER DIVERSION
AND RESPONSIBILITY-SHIFTING
Corporate lawmaker opportunism partially explains the prominence of
executive pay compared to other, arguably more pressing, corporate law
issues-ownership-related decisions involving mergers, takeovers, and
even certain operational decisions, such as asset divestitures, product de-
velopment, and raising capital. 400 At most, excessive executive pay, at
the firm level, is merely a symptom of the greater agency cost problem.
On average, executive pay for the top five executives at Fortune 500 com-
panies in 2006 constituted 1.82 percent of profits.40 1 For large companies,
the actual impact of executive compensation is minimal.40 2
The overemphasis on executive compensation functions as a blue pill
or diversion from other pertinent socio-economic issues, like the mini-
398. See E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What Happened in Delaware
Corporate Law and Governance from 1992-2004?, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1399, 1411, 1506
(2005).
399. Within this scenario, lawmakers arguably favor the highest denominator of constit-
uents-corporate management and institutional shareholders who experience fewer infor-
mation constraints and possess a greater ability to detect lawmaker opportunism.
400. See Rosen, supra note 171, at 2932 (discussing how House Bill 1257 potentially
diverts attention from more pressing business issues).
401. See Loewenstein, supra note 58, at 11 (acknowledging arguments that executive
compensation has a small impact on company profits).
402: Jerry Goldberg, The Fortunate 2500 of the Fortune 500, http://www.jgfortunate2500
list.com/home.html (follow the "see the 2007 List" hyperlink) (last visited Aug. 17, 2008).
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mum wage, health insurance, retirement accounts, education, and social
security, that are more relevant to ordinary Americans. 403 This diversion
of populist outrage has negative consequences for populist corporate con-
stituencies. By singling out and seeking to limit pay for a few executives
at the top of the wealth pyramid, lawmakers may divert pressure from
improving the plight of those at the bottom via increasing the minimum
wage or other redistributive policies and interventions. Despite the theo-
retical emphasis on limiting the costs of managerial appropriation and
executive pay, slack in compensation practices extends beyond the CEO
to employees throughout an organization and merits evaluation.404 But
this particular aspect of compensation reform has received less attention
from legal commentators as well as politicians. A reason for the en-
hanced focus on executive pay versus the pay of other employees is that
executive pay involves greater potential for self-dealing.
Another interesting question is whether corporate managers should be
overly concerned about the emphasis on executive pay. Perhaps not.
Certainly no director or CEO enjoys public embarrassment like the
shaming Michael Eisner received before the Delaware courts.40 5 How-
ever, the political salience of executive pay may also divert populist out-
rage and, to a degree, shareholder attention away from other corporate
governance issues that are more problematic for managers (for example,
altering internal power relationships or the balance between state and
federal law). As illustrated above, executive compensation reform is
often moderate and will not upset the internal affairs of the corporation
nor displace business judgment. Therefore, managers should not be
overly distressed about the focus on executive pay because it averts more
substantial intrusions that upset existing power relationships. 406
D. THE POSITIVE SIDE OF POLITICS?: AVERTING FUTURE
BACKLASH AND INEFFICIENCY
Notwithstanding the costs of lawmaker opportunism, there are poten-
tial positive benefits associated with incorporating political effects into
the discussion of executive compensation reform and, in broader terms,
corporate governance reform. Politics has the ability to disrupt markets,
but it also has the power to mediate economic turmoil. In order to avert
a greater backlash generated by economic shocks, "inefficient legal struc-
tures may arise and survive, despite the fact that they could not withstand
a normal efficiency critique. '40 7 Strategic inefficiency may, on balance,
403. See THE MATRIX, supra note 1.
404. See generally Rosen, supra note 171 (discussing the exclusion of high-salaried em-
ployees from executive compensation reform).
405. See In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 760-63 (Del. Ch.
2005).
406. See Roe, supra note 190, at 217; see also discussion infra Part IV.C.2. Advisory
say-on-pay votes are perhaps an example.
407. See Roe, supra note 190, at 217 ("The prospect of backlash-or of strategically
tempering otherwise efficient rules and institutions to finesse away a more destructive
backlash--complicates a law and economics inquiry.").
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be a net positive.408 Thus, in order to prevent greater future inefficiency,
lawmakers may create moderately inefficient rules, for example, execu-
tive compensation reforms. 40 9 The political value of strategic inefficiency
is not diminished by the fact that one cannot measure with any degree of
precision the amount of political backlash averted or the necessary
amount of political accommodation. 410 Whereas the general tendency is
to ascribe negative value to interest group dynamics and politics, the in-
teraction of inefficiency with backlash may reflect a brighter side.411
Lawmaker pursuit of self-interest may actually benefit shareholder and
non-shareholder constituencies alike. 412
408. Mark Roe discusses the operation of strategic inefficiency in the face of backlash:
The dampening rules may enhance a system's adaptivity and stability, pre-
serving the core efficiency tendencies of capitalism, private property, and
competitive markets, by conceding a few economically unwise but politically
astute regulations here and there. One could believe a set of legal institutions
to be inefficient one by one-antitakeover rules, slow chapter 11 reorganiza-
tions, Glass-Steagall, old-style antitrust, and a list to which we could all
add-and still one cannot conclude that the whole set is inefficient, because
the inefficient fringe may preserve that efficient core of private property, mo-
bility, and competition. Hence we see the difficulty for law and economics
scholarship, even today in the United States, and even without the alien and
improbable risk of fundamental revolutionary political turmoil.
Id. at 237-38.
409. Id. at 239 ("To create the public good of political tranquility, a system may some-
times choose technically suboptimal production . .
410. See id. at 240.
411. See id. at 240-41.
412. See id. at 238 n.40 (expressing doubt over whether executive compensation fits this
pattern because excessive CEO pay might simply be an agency cost, not a necessary fea-
ture to firm productivity). The Obama administration's recent executive pay rhetoric and
reforms can be viewed as an attempt to minimize public outrage and generate broader
support for the unprecedented $787 billion dollar economic stimulus package. See Bank
Bonuses: Sound and Fury, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 14, 2009, at 14.
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